Economia, política e democracia: as sabatinas no Senado Federal dos indicados ao Banco Central nos governos FHC e Lula

Albuquerque, Mateus Coelho Martins de; Belieiro, José Carlos Martines

doi:10.1590/0103-335220193001

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Regarding appointments by the Senate, it is worth recalling that in Brazil, as a rule, senators systematically approve most of the nominations submitted to them, such as of senior managers of the Central Bank, diplomats, Supreme Court Justices, and of the members nominated to the Councils studied herein. According to a survey, the average rate of approval by the Senators of nominations exceeds 90% (Albuquerque & Belieiro, 2019). Therefore, as effective veto power on the part of the Legislative Branch does not exist, once again the autonomy of the members of the justice system is ensured, to the detriment of accountability.…”

Section: Discussion and Final Remarks 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability beyond Institutional Rules: How the Corporative Interests Affect the National Councils of Justice and of the Public Prosecutor’s Service in Brazil

Viegas,

Abrucio,

Carvalho Teixeira

et al. 2023

BLR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article analyzes the design, composition, and normative activity of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and of the National Council of the Public Prosecutor's Service (CNMP) in Brazil, as explanatory elements of the type of control they exercise over their members. We conducted an inquiry into council member appointment criteria member profiles, and into how these aspects affect the Councils' decisions. For that, we conducted a collective biography of the 203 members of these judicial Councils over the 2005-2019 period and an analysis of the content of the resolutions issued over that same period. We identified the formal rules and informal practices that guide the composition and functioning of these Councils and contend that the combination of these elements leads to a process in which corporatist accountability prevails over democratic accountability. The Brazilian Councils are, therefore, the expression of a symbiosis between accountability institutions and those accountable.

show abstract

Section: Discussion and Final Remarks 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability beyond Institutional Rules: How the Corporative Interests Affect the National Councils of Justice and of the Public Prosecutor’s Service in Brazil

Viegas,

Abrucio,

Carvalho Teixeira

et al. 2023

BLR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Fix is in? Parliamentary Scrutiny of Appointments of the Heads of Brazilian Regulatory Agencies

Lopes

Vieira

2022

Parliamentary Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This manuscript analyses the parliamentary scrutiny of the presidential appointments to the direction of independent Brazilian Regulatory Agencies from an in-depth case study of the heads of the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency—ANVISA, between 1999 and 2021. In Brazil, the Senate has the final decision on these appointments, exercising a dual function: parliamentary control over presidential patronage and selecting future heads of agencies. The objective of this article was to explain how the parliament exercises these functions and interferes in the appointment process. The results indicate that, although the formal process of parliamentary scrutiny seems like a game of marked cards, where it is already known in advance that the result will be approval, the Parliament plays an anticipatory role of presidential decisions, interfering in the timing of appointments and the possibility of influence over the choice of nominees.

show abstract

Quem controla os controladores no sistema de justiça? A composição dos Conselhos Nacionais da Justiça e do Ministério Público

Viegas,

Loureiro,

Abrucio

et al. 2024

Rev. Sociol. Polit.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

RESUMO Introdução: O artigo trata da composição do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) e do Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (CNMP), entre 2005 e 2019. Uma análise dos seus membros é um fator fundamental para explicar o funcionamento desses Conselhos. Materiais e métodos: Realizamos uma prosopografia dos 105 integrantes do CNJ e dos 98 integrantes do CNMP comparando seus respectivos perfis em busca de semelhanças e diferenças. Resultados: A composição de CNJ e CNMP pode ser melhor entendida pela lógica informal do que pelos pelas regras formais de investidura dessas instituições. Por lógica informal compreendemos: i) a política que cruza as instituições judiciárias; ii) as redes acessadas e os critérios que retroalimentam filtros de seleção para as cúpulas do Judiciário e Ministério Público; e iii) os fatores exógenos à institucionalidade dos Conselhos, como pressões de associações de classe. Discussão: O padrão de recrutamento explica a fraca accountability do CNJ e do CNMP, que funcionam segundo o modelo do isomorfismo institucional: embora tenham sido criados para controlar o Judiciário e o Ministério Público, se adaptaram para se moldarem às preferências dos controlados.

show abstract

Economia, política e democracia: as sabatinas no Senado Federal dos indicados ao Banco Central nos governos FHC e Lula

Cited by 3 publications

References 2 publications

Accountability beyond Institutional Rules: How the Corporative Interests Affect the National Councils of Justice and of the Public Prosecutor’s Service in Brazil

Accountability beyond Institutional Rules: How the Corporative Interests Affect the National Councils of Justice and of the Public Prosecutor’s Service in Brazil

The Fix is in? Parliamentary Scrutiny of Appointments of the Heads of Brazilian Regulatory Agencies

Quem controla os controladores no sistema de justiça? A composição dos Conselhos Nacionais da Justiça e do Ministério Público

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About