2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.023
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Economic voting in Latin America: A general model

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Cited by 84 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…These articles contribute to a growing literature on the dynamics of approval in presidential systems (e.g., Arce and Carrión, 2010;Carlin, Carreras and Love, forthcoming;Cuzán and Bundrick, 1997;Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-Gallardo, 2012;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009;Pérez-Liñán, 2007) by highlighting a set of factors that explain why some presidents deviate from the typical cyclical pattern. In line with previous research on economic voting in Latin America (e.g., Boelhouwer Menezes, 2018;Benton, 2005;Cabezas, 2015;Cabezas and Navia, 2010;Echegaray, 2005;Gélineau, 2007;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009;Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013;Love and Windsor, 2018;Luna, 2002;Menezes, 2018;Murillo and Visconti, 2017;Singer, 2013Singer, , 2015Singer and Carlin, 2013;Visconti, 2017), all of the authors in this special issue agree that economic outputs -and economic perceptions of performance-go a long way in explaining patterns of executive approval. Also in line with previous work (Powell and Whitten, 1993), some of the articles find that institutions can alter patterns of approval.…”
Section: Case Studies Of Outliers Of Presidential Approvalsupporting
confidence: 85%
“…These articles contribute to a growing literature on the dynamics of approval in presidential systems (e.g., Arce and Carrión, 2010;Carlin, Carreras and Love, forthcoming;Cuzán and Bundrick, 1997;Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-Gallardo, 2012;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009;Pérez-Liñán, 2007) by highlighting a set of factors that explain why some presidents deviate from the typical cyclical pattern. In line with previous research on economic voting in Latin America (e.g., Boelhouwer Menezes, 2018;Benton, 2005;Cabezas, 2015;Cabezas and Navia, 2010;Echegaray, 2005;Gélineau, 2007;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009;Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013;Love and Windsor, 2018;Luna, 2002;Menezes, 2018;Murillo and Visconti, 2017;Singer, 2013Singer, , 2015Singer and Carlin, 2013;Visconti, 2017), all of the authors in this special issue agree that economic outputs -and economic perceptions of performance-go a long way in explaining patterns of executive approval. Also in line with previous work (Powell and Whitten, 1993), some of the articles find that institutions can alter patterns of approval.…”
Section: Case Studies Of Outliers Of Presidential Approvalsupporting
confidence: 85%
“…Research on retrospective voting has provided a wide range of evidence that voters consider parties' and politicians' past behaviour for their voting decisions. Many scholars have studied the status of the economy as a predictor of voting choices (Lewis‐Beck & Ratto ; Fiorina ; Key ). It appears that elections are instruments through which voters reward incumbents for good economic performance, and punish them for bad economic performance.…”
Section: Expanding Retrospective Voting To Pledgesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Research on industrialized democracies widely documents the economic vote theory (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000;Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007;Duch & Stevenson, 2008). Studies on Latin American cases replicate those findings (Lewis-Beck & Ratto, 2013;Gélineau & Singer, 2015;Nadeau et al, 2017). The basic premise is that voters reward or punish incumbents depending on the performance of the national economy.…”
Section: Economic Votementioning
confidence: 76%