Effect of Tenure Systems on Agricultural Efficiency

Production Economics and Farm Management: a Century of Contributions

“…Since before Marshall (1920), some agricultural economists have presumed the inefficiency of share contracts over fixed wage and fixed rent contracts in agriculture. Schickele (1941) and Heady (1947) had the view that share contracts are inefficient but Heady mentioned that cost sharing could lead to Pareto optimality. D. Gale Johnson (1950) looked at more general equilibrium considerations, concluding that these "make crop-share tenancy function reasonably well.…”

Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja

“…Following A. Smith, all the economists until G. Johnson (1950) have considered sharecropping as a "practice which is hurtful to the whole society," an unexplained failure of the invisible hand that should be either discouraged by taxation (A. Smith) or slightly improved by appropriate sharing of variable factors (Schickele (1941) and Heady (1947)). …”

Catchments, sub-catchments and private spaces: Scale and process in managing microbial pollution from source to sea

“…Although the amount of research on precise relationships between occupancy and environmental outcomes has been limited (Winter, 2007), there is a long history of observations of relationships between tenancy and agricultural economic performance (Higgs, 1972;Hill and Gasson 1985;Schickele, 1941). Occupancy arrangements may influence the level of investment in pollution mitigation technologies with owners or secure tenants more likely to be able to invest (c.f.…”