Effectiveness of GNSS Spoofing Countermeasure Based on Receiver CNR Measurements

Nielsen, John; Dehghanian, V.; Lachapelle, Guy

doi:10.1155/2012/501679

Cited by 31 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Under normal conditions, the received signal power changes smoothly with the satellite movement and surroundings change. However, when a higher power spoofing signal controls the receiver tracking loop, the received CNR may experience a sudden change that can indicate the presence of spoofing interference [6,7]. Wen et al [8] shows that when the distance between the spoofer antenna and the receiver changes from 8 to 100 m, the received CNR reduces by 22 dB.…”

Section: Anti-spoofing Methods In the Signal Processing Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

Xiao

Tang

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering

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Spoofing interference can mislead a target receiver to report a wrong position and time. This can pose a serious threat to the security of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) applications, and may cause undesirable consequences. As such, anti-spoofing techniques have become a hot research topic within the GNSS discipline. This paper provides a review of recent research in the field of GNSS anti-spoofing on the receiver side. The vulnerability of GNSS receivers to spoofing attacks is studied, and the anti-spoofing algorithms around the base band digital signal processing layer and the information processing layer of the receiver is discussed. The limitation, cost and applicability of these anti-spoofing methods are investigated and the trend of anti-spoofing research in the future is analyzed.

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Section: Anti-spoofing Methods In the Signal Processing Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

Xiao

Tang

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering

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“…Many protection solutions against spoofing of GNSS receivers have been proposed in the last decade on that front [3] [11]. The purpose of security protection techniques is based on providing the integrity of transmitted data and also the authenticity of the transmitter (satellites).…”

Section: State-of-the-art In Spoofing Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the average spoofer and authentic signal power is known then the detection of spoofing attack is trivial. However, if is completely unknown then it has a finite optimum, that is, a function of and the type of propagation environment detected by the receiver [11] in which an expression for computing the optimum was deduced and applied to various channels.…”

Section: State-of-the-art In Spoofing Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to simulate this spoofed signal, we positioned one satellite simulating spoofer very close to the Earth, such that the power variation due to the movement can be clearly detected. Previous papers that were considering estimation of the signal power in order to form the spoofing test were based on the absolute power estimation and its statistics, such as the works presented in [10] and [11]. We took different approach, consisting in the computation of the moving variance of the power estimation that is a metrics much more sensitive on the change between the transition between the legitimate and a spoofing signal.…”

Section: Figure 1 -Limitation Of a Zone Controllable By An Adversary mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-test detection and protection algorithm against spoofing attacks on GNSS receivers

Jovanović

Botteron

Farine

2014

2014 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium - PLANS 2014

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Abstract-The vulnerability against interference, spoofing, and jamming of GNSS receivers is considered nowadays a major security concern. This security threat is exacerbated with the existing market availability of GPS jamming and spoofing equipment sold at reasonable prices. If jamming is the main issue faced at present, spoofing, which allows hijacking someone from the expected path, may lead to even worse consequences. Even with the latest security measures that are going to be deployed on the Galileo PRS signals, GNSS receivers are prone to attacks that are relatively easy to implement. In this paper, we identify different countermeasures and security schemes that can be used against spoofing attacks. These countermeasures include some modifications on the GNSS receiver's side, rather than requiring modifications of the whole existing GNSS infrastructure. More specifically, we propose a detection and protection scheme consisting of several statistical tests, based on the computations of moving variances of Doppler offset and C/No estimates, together with a consistency test of the PVT computation. We evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme through simulations and using a measurement setup consisting of a Spirent GSS8000 full constellation simulator whose output is combined with the one from a rooftop GPS antenna before being fed to a receiver frontend. Finally, we compute the probability of detection and false alarm in spoofing detection using the proposed scheme.

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“…The non‐sophisticated spoofing is one of the most popular spoofing modes, which broadcasts a set (or subset) of replicas of the currently visible authentic global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals, but with faked code phases and Doppler shifts [5, 6]. In general, the spoofing and authentic signals are separated in code‐delay‐space (CDS).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sensitivity analysis of the vestigial signal defence‐based civil GNSS spoofing detection method

Zhang

Zhan

Feng

et al. 2017

IET Radar, Sonar & Navigation

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The vestigial signal defense (VSD) method is widely used for detecting intermediate spoofing attacks via monitoring the vestigial signals within the receiver. It is popular and promising for two reasons. One is that it is one of the most effective methods against intermediate spoofing attacks unless the spoofer could suppress the authentic signals. The other is that it is easy to implement as it is totally softwaredefined and receiver-autonomous. Though VSD is promising, it can be vulnerable to spoofing signals with strong strength. Because the strong spoofing signals can significantly lift the receiver noise floor and reduce the vestigial signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) to below the SINR detection threshold, preventing the vestigial signal from being detected. To low-costly address this issue, this paper firstly investigates the effect of spoofing strength on the availability of VSD on the basis of vestigial SINR model. Then, the improvement scheme is proposed based on the investigation, which is low-cost but effective. As shown by the rigorous analysis, the noise floor would be considerably increased and the vestigial SINR would fall below the SINR detection threshold, even when the spoofing signals are not much stronger. However, if the receiver is able to extend integration time and roughly estimate the noise floor, the VSD can be more robust to much stronger spoofing signals.

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Effectiveness of GNSS Spoofing Countermeasure Based on Receiver CNR Measurements

Cited by 31 publications

References 5 publications

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

Multi-test detection and protection algorithm against spoofing attacks on GNSS receivers

Sensitivity analysis of the vestigial signal defence‐based civil GNSS spoofing detection method

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