El lugar del Brasil en la política exterior de la Argentina: La vision del otro

Rusell, Roberto; Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel

doi:10.2307/3455844

Cited by 26 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…At first glance, structure may explain most of the chosen behaviour of Argentina vis-à-vis Brazil, given that they have previously had a relationship of competitive partnership and that their long-term relationship has evolved from one of hard to one of soft balancing (Russell and Tokatlian, 2003;Malamud, 2011). Argentina has been soft balancing Brazil through the use of tactics of institutional binding, specifically as a result of the creation and development of the MERCOSUR on the basis of the two countries' parity therein (Malamud, 2011).…”

Section: Domestic Drivers Of Contestation: South American Secondary Pmentioning

confidence: 98%

Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America

Flemes

Wehner

2014

Int Polit

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This article analyzes what the drivers of contestation of secondary powers vis-à-vis the regional power are, differentiating therein between structural, historical, behavioural and domestic such drivers. We argue that in regions characterized by relative stability where major interstate violent conflicts are unlikely, as is the case in South America, secondary powers rely mainly on soft-balancing mechanisms vis-à-vis the regional power. Whereas Brazil's foreign policy behaviour is key to South American secondary powers being induced to contest the country's powerhood, the choices that the foreign policy elites of those secondary powers make regarding what the specific expression of soft balancing is to be are influenced by certain domestic groups. Empirical examples are given of how Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela as secondary powers unfold these domestic drivers, which shape their different ways of soft balancing Brazil. The article thus explains why some secondary powers rely more on institutional binding, others on economic statecraft, or buffering, while others contest by offering and building alternative leadership proposals.

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Section: Domestic Drivers Of Contestation: South American Secondary Pmentioning

confidence: 98%

Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America

Flemes

Wehner

2014

Int Polit

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“…O novo chanceler assumiu seu posto numa conjuntura difícil, quando as mudanças no comércio internacional dificultavam a manutenção da tradicional orientação pró-Grã-Bretanha da diplomacia argentina. A nova realidade era que Londres já não tinha capacidades econômicas de manter os laços especiais com o país sul-americano (RUSSEL; TOKATLIAN, 2003). Para piorar, a Grande Depressão teve como efeito um reforço das relações nas relações coloniais dentro do Império Britânico, o que inevitavelmente significou uma redução do mercado do país europeu para os produtos argentinos (PETERSON, 1970).…”

Section: A Oposição De Buenos Airesunclassified

“…Havia grupos que defendiam uma maior aproximação com o Brasil ou com os Estados Unidos -este último já como um dos maiores parceiros comerciais, porém incapaz de oferecer um vínculo especial como aquele antes desfrutado com a Grã-Bretanha -como forma de diversificar os mercados externos, mas a elite governante do país receava tomar tal posição. Como resultado, Saavedra Lamas dirigiu a política externa argentina bastante ativa, que ao mesmo tempo buscava manter abertos os laços com a Europa, mediar os conflitos sul-americanos com o Brasil ao mesmo tempo em que mantinha a rivalidade e numa posição de oposição as tentativas norte-americanas de estabelecer hegemonia na região sob o marco do pan-americanismo (RUSSEL; TOKATLIAN, 2003).…”

Section: A Oposição De Buenos Airesunclassified

Brasil, Estados Unidos e Argentina no “caso dos contratorpedeiros”, 1937

Waldmann

2017

Estudos Internacionais

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The relationship between Brazil and Argentina was historically known for its rivalry, which occasionally manifested in diplomat-military crisis. One crisis occurred in August 1937, when Brazil and United States negotiated the cession of destroyers to the Brazilian Navy. Since mid-1930s, Vargas government struggled to accomplish a naval renovation plan, to restructure the obsolete Brazilian fleet. The international scenario offered great opportunities to the Brazilian, as the polarization intensified the dispute to supply armaments and for the position of Brazil on the system of alliances. Washington, under the Good Neighbor Policy and alarmed with the growing Axis presence in Latin America, decided to negotiate with the Brazilians despite the isolationist • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v.4 n.3, p.75 -97 76Congress resistance, offering six destroyers to Brazil. However, a strong criticism arouses against the agreement both in the American public opinion as well in the international community, especially from Argentina. Alarmed by the negative internal and external reactions, Washington gave up, for Brazilian dismay. Proceeding from the classical notions of naval diplomacy and balance of power theory, my goal is to understand the reasons and motivations, in view of domestic and foreign policy, of the main countries involved as well the international effects of the agreement.

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“…Brazil's attempt to attract Argentina to follow its leadership is “tantamount to sleeping with the enemy” (Malamud ; 11). In fact, Argentina still sees itself as Brazil's (soft‐)balancer in the region (Russell and Tokatlian ). These states' relationship has been captured by the term “competitive‐partnership” (Malamud :92).…”

Section: Argentina's Role Expectations Of Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power

Wehner

2014

Foreign Policy Anal

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This article sets out how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power, as well as Brazil's strategy of using its regional powerhood to further its own ambitions of becoming a global power on the international stage. The article assesses the expectations of these three countries, specifically in terms of what kind of roles they attribute to Brazil. Following this empirical interest, the article develops a role theoretical framework for understanding the importance of Others' expectations for the role con‐ception and enactment of the Self. The article also elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region,” as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.

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El lugar del Brasil en la política exterior de la Argentina: La vision del otro

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America

Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America

Brasil, Estados Unidos e Argentina no “caso dos contratorpedeiros”, 1937

Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power

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