Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power

Abstract

This article sets out how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power, as well as Brazil's strategy of using its regional powerhood to further its own ambitions of becoming a global power on the international stage. The article assesses the expectations of these three countries, specifically in terms of what kind of roles they attribute to Brazil. Following this empirical interest, the article develops a role theoretical framework for understanding the importance of Others' expectations for the role con‐ception and enactment of the Self. The article also elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region,” as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.

Narratives of Change and Theorisations on Continuity: the Duality of the Concept of Emerging Power in International Relations

“…Leadership and authority are perceived as central components in this sense (Flemes 2007;Nolte 2010;Destradi 2010;Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2013). Hence, a diplomatic claim for regional leadership must be grounded in the possession of will and resources to provide public goods and act as the stabiliser of the subsystem, but also in being recognised for this role (Mattli 1999;Flemes 2007;Schirm 2010;Wehner 2014). Pedersen (2002) conceives this social element of the path to leadership as a cooperative hegemony, in which the benefits from cooperation -i.e.…”

Diplomatic Dominos: South America and the Recognition of [the State of] Palestine

“…(Agar, 2014) The Brazilian move to a more activist position on the world stage was initiated by its president, Lula da Silva, (Bernal-Mayal, 2012;Giacagglia, 2010;Lessa, 2012;Ondetta, 2010) but has also witnessed recognition from within the region. (Gardini, 2016;Morton, 1981Morton, /1982Wehner, 2015) On December 1, 2010, President Lula da Silva sent a letter to Mahmoud Abbas manifesting Brazil's recognition to the Palestinian State and his hope for a future pacific and safe coexistence between Israel and Palestine. This decision was a result of Abbas' petition to Brazil earlier that year and was coherent with Brazil's sup/port to UN resolutions against Israel's occupations of Palestinian territories.…”

Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America

“…Argentina has also supported the launch of other groups that can serve to institutionally bind Brazil in South and Latin America, respectively, such as the aforementioned UNASUR as well as the Community of Latin American States (CELAC) (Wehner, 2014;Tokatlian, 2013). Further, Argentina has also relied on buffering tactics by developing ties with peers such as Venezuela, which was fully incorporated into the MERCOSUR in 2012.…”

“…Chile, meanwhile, has pursued a rather different path of contestation due to the influence of domestic politics vis-à-vis Brazil's leadership (Flemes and Wehner, 2012), despite both it and Argentina being secondary powers and consequently both relying on soft-balancing roles (Wehner, 2014). Like Argentina, Chile listens to its domestic economic groups -but, unlike its neighbour, it prioritizes the free trade group that is aligned in ethos with the state interest and model of export promotion.…”

“…Instead, secondary powers' status positions are linked to playing the role of soft balancer (Wehner, 2014) vis-à-vis a regional power in those regions where rivalry is replaced by competitive patterns. Thus, soft balancing is not a revisionist strategy designed to reconfigure the regional order; rather, it only aims to hamper and constrain the further rise of the regional power (see Shaw, 2015).…”