Elite bargains and policy priorities in authoritarian regimes: Agenda setting in China under Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao

Abstract

What explains agenda outcomes in authoritarian regimes? Existing research attributes policy priorities to either the autocrat's survival needs or the co‐optation of external interests. The former leaves out policy choices beyond the calculus of regime survival; and the latter elite power play that bears more immediately on government priorities than activities at the fringe. We hypothesize that officials working under autocrats who seek co‐optative elite bargains are more likely to prioritize domain‐specific concerns and less inclined to disrupt the status quo than those under leaders who rule with coercion. Our comparison of the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations of China reveals patterns consistent with these hypotheses: Hu's “steward” leadership is associated with increased agenda inertia and diversity, whereas policy priorities change in greater frequency and converge to a stronger focus under Xi's “strongman” rule. These contrasts are also clearer in policy venues closer to the central leader's direct control.

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