Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda

Tangri, Roger; Mwenda, Andrew M.

doi:10.1080/14662040802005336

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This happens as political and bureaucratic elites seek to consolidate and maintain their positions for personal gain. 40 As observed in other analyses, productive sector policy reforms which were likely to negatively affect votes in Uganda were dropped in favour of those that enhanced opportunities for election victory.46 Similar to the findings of this study, even when vote winning has sometimes influenced policies responding to perceived public interests, such policies tend to pursue short-term visible results. 47 The actors ensure that their policies can clearly be linked to them by the voters at the time of seeking political support.…”

Section: Elite Interests and The Exercise Of Power In The Policy Processsupporting

confidence: 74%

“…The control of policy processes in Uganda by a few bureaucrats occupying strategic positions in government departments loyal to political elites continues. 39,40 Highly placed bureaucrats tend to have more authority, trust by the political elite and control over the policy processes and moderate participation of all actors. Similar influence was exercised by bureaucrats in Burkina Faso during the policy process for integrated community case management.…”

Section: Elite Formation and Influence In The Policy Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This gives room for donors to impose policies in furtherance of their global agendas. 1,39,40,48 Since maternal health policy processes involved competing actors with diverse interests 2,49 actors sometimes pursued feasible alternatives (pragmatic interests). In some cases, policies were calibrated to fit donor conditionalities.…”

Section: Elite Interests and The Exercise Of Power In The Policy Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

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"The Actor Is Policy": Application of Elite Theory to Explore Actors’ Interests and Power Underlying Maternal Health Policies in Uganda, 2000-2015

Mukuru

Kiwanuka

Gilson

et al. 2020

Int J Health Policy Manag

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Background: The persistence of high maternal mortality and consistent failure in low- and middle-income countries to achieve global targets such as Millennium Development Goal five (MDG 5) is usually explained from epidemiological, interventional and health systems perspectives. The role of policy elites and their interests remains inadequately explored in this debate. This study examined elites and how their interests drove maternal health policies and actions in ways that could explain policy failure for MDG 5 in Uganda. Methods: We conducted a retrospective qualitative study of Uganda’s maternal health policies from 2000 to 2015 (MDG period). Thirty key informant interviews and 2 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with national policy-makers, who directly participated in the formulation of Uganda’s maternal health policies during the MDG period. We reviewed 9 National Maternal Health Policy documents. Data were analysed inductively using elite theory. Results: Maternal health policies were mainly driven by a small elite group comprised of Senior Ministry of Health (MoH) officials, some members of cabinet and health development partners (HDPs) who wielded more power than other actors. The resulting policies often appeared to be skewed towards elites’ personal political and economic interests, rather than maternal mortality reduction. For a few, however, interests aligned with reducing maternal mortality. Since complying with the government policy-making processes would have exposed elites’ personal interests, they mainly drafted policies as service standards and programme documents to bypass the formal policy process. Conclusion: Uganda’s maternal health policies were mainly influenced by the elites’ personal interests rather than by the goal of reducing maternal mortality. This was enabled by the formal guidance for policy-making which gives elites control over the policy process. Accelerating maternal mortality reduction will require re-engineering the policy process to prevent public officials from infusing policies with their interests, and enable percolation of ideas from the public and frontline.

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Section: Elite Interests and The Exercise Of Power In The Policy Processsupporting

confidence: 74%

Section: Elite Formation and Influence In The Policy Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Elite Interests and The Exercise Of Power In The Policy Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

"The Actor Is Policy": Application of Elite Theory to Explore Actors’ Interests and Power Underlying Maternal Health Policies in Uganda, 2000-2015

Mukuru

Kiwanuka

Gilson

et al. 2020

Int J Health Policy Manag

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show abstract

“…Estreitamente associada à perspectiva anterior, encontra-se a abordagem elitista. Vários estudos têm destacado o importante papel desempenhado pelas elites políticas (Della Porta;Mény, 1995;Rose-Ackerman, 1999;Johnston, 2005;Mbaku, 1996;Ojukwu;Shopeju, 2010) e militares (Tangri;Mwenda, 2003) nas trocas corruptas. Resumidamente, esta corrente analítica assenta no modelo do rent seeking (Tullock, 1965;Lambsdorff, 2002), do qual decorrem os conceitos de elite capture (Dutta, 2009) e predatory rule (Bavister-Gould, 2011): detentoras de um poder consequente do cargo que ocupam (independentemente da forma como este foi obtido), as elites utilizam o seu poder para enriquecer à custa dos recursos que controlam, estabelecendo muitas vezes uma cultura de cleptocracia dominante (Johnston, 2005).…”

Section: O Estudo Da Corrupção Em áFricaunclassified

Corrupção e pobreza em África: os legados coloniais em perspectiva comparada

Dias¹,

Lúcio²,

Coelho³

2015

RSP

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Partindo da constatação que os níveis médios de corrupção nos países da África lusófona apresentam valores relativamente mais baixos do que os seus congéneres da África francófona e anglófona, o presente artigo analisa esta questão à luz de uma abordagem que assenta num quadro teórico mais clássico: o neo-institucionalismo. Neste contexto, explorou-se a hipótese segundo a qual os legados coloniais (entendidos enquanto conjunto de instituições formais e informais herdadas das antigas potências colonizadoras após os processos de descolonização) desempenham um papel relevante na explicação dos níveis de corrupção dos países da África subsaariana. Por outro lado, procurou-se também perceber se estes legados apresentam algum elo com os elevados níveis de pobreza humana que existem nestes Estados. Os testes estatísticos exploratórios que levámos a cabo mostram que a variável legado colonial aparece significativamente relacionada com os níveis de corrupção, ao passo que não existe qualquer relação com os níveis de pobreza humana. Conclui-se, pois, que parece existir uma especificidade no caso da África lusófona, convidativa do ponto de vista da realização de análises futuras mais aprofundadas.Palavras-chave: corrupção, pobreza, desigualdade social

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“…Thachil (2011), for instance, has argued that the BJP political party in India benefited electorally when its grassroots organizations provided generalized social welfare services to a non-traditional demographic of poor and low-caste households.6 SeeMoss et al (2006) for a review of this literature Besley and Persson (2011). also find that taxation develops state capacity and accountability, and aid can undermine both.7 This idea of aid donors as "anti-politics machines" has been argued generally byFerguson (1990) and in the specific case of Uganda byTangri and Mwenda (2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

Do Anti-Poverty Programs Sway Voters? Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Blattman

Emeriau

Fiala

2018

The Review of Economics and Statistics

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A Ugandan government program allowed groups of young people to submit proposals to start skilled enterprises. Among 535 eligible proposals, the government randomly selected 265 to receive grants of nearly $400 per person. Blattman et al. (2014) showed that, after four years, the program raised employment by 17% and earnings 38%. This paper shows that, rather than rewarding the government in elections, beneficiaries increased opposition party membership, campaigning, and voting. Higher incomes are associated with opposition support, and we hypothesize that financial independence frees the poor to express political preferences publicly, being less reliant on patronage and other political transfers.

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Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda

Cited by 24 publications

References 11 publications

"The Actor Is Policy": Application of Elite Theory to Explore Actors’ Interests and Power Underlying Maternal Health Policies in Uganda, 2000-2015

"The Actor Is Policy": Application of Elite Theory to Explore Actors’ Interests and Power Underlying Maternal Health Policies in Uganda, 2000-2015

Corrupção e pobreza em África: os legados coloniais em perspectiva comparada

Do Anti-Poverty Programs Sway Voters? Experimental Evidence from Uganda

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