Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Villalobos, Mario; Dewhurst, Joe

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1386-z

Cited by 25 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This example shows in fine detail why higher-level causality can, in many cases, be seen to be more important than lower-level processes. This is closely related to the idea of autonomous systems , characterized by their organizational and operational closure [ 138 ], where [ 135 ] Organizational closure refers to the self-referential (circular and recursive) network of relations that defines the system as a unity, and operational closure to the re-entrant and recurrent dynamics of such a system which is just the idea above. This discussion is related to the idea of Autopoiesis—a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself—mentioned above, and to the idea of Autocatalytic sets [ 69 , 70 ].…”

Section: Interlevel Causal Closure: Biologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts

Ellis

2020

Found Phys

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The causal closure of physics is usually discussed in a context free way. Here I discuss it in the context of engineering systems and biology, where strong emergence takes place due to a combination of upwards emergence and downwards causation (Ellis, Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology, 2020, arXiv :2004.13591). Firstly, I show that causal closure is strictly limited in terms of spatial interactions because these are cases that are of necessity strongly interacting with the environment. Effective Spatial Closure holds ceteris parabus, and can be violated by Black Swan Events. Secondly, I show that causal closure in the hierarchy of emergence is a strictly interlevel affair, and in the cases of engineering and biology encompasses all levels from the social level to the particle physics level. However Effective Causal Closure can usefully be defined for a restricted set of levels, and one can experimentally determine Effective Theories that hold at each level. This does not however imply those effective theories are causally complete by themselves. In particular, the particle physics level is not causally complete by itself in the contexts of solid state physics (because of interlevel wave-particle duality), digital computers (where algorithms determine outcomes), or biology (because of time dependent constraints). Furthermore Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in all these contexts.

show abstract

Section: Interlevel Causal Closure: Biologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts

Ellis

2020

Found Phys

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Importantly, as Jacob (2015) observes, enactivists break with the behaviorism in setting their face against the idea that embodied activity should be understood as any kind of simple output in reply to an input. Indeed, enactivists typically reject the input-output model of mind outright (see, Villalobos and Dewhurst, 2017a , b ).…”

Section: Adjusting Our Betmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet.

show abstract

“…Despite their rejection of computationalism, we do not think that this should cause any concern to Varela, Thompson, and Rosch. As the account is non‐representational, there is nothing at odds with being both a computing mechanism of this sort and an autonomous system (see Villalobos and Dewhurst ). By adopting this account of computation, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch can make their use of cellular automata consistent with that of other theorists, who typically assume such systems to be computational.…”

Section: The Enactive Automaton As a Computing Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism

Dewhurst

Villalobos

2017

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti‐computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a hidden background assumption, shared by both Varela, Thompson, and Rosch and the computational theories of mind which they were responding to. This assumption is that computation requires representation, and that computational states must bear representational content. For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, representational content is incompatible with cognition, and so from their perspective the automaton that they describe cannot, despite appearances, be computational. However, there now exist several accounts of computation that do not make this assumption, and do not characterize computation in terms of representational content. In light of these recent developments, we will argue that it is quite straightforward to characterize the enactive automaton as a non‐representational computing mechanism, one that we do not think they should have any objections to.

show abstract

Enactive autonomy in computational systems

Cited by 25 publications

References 24 publications

The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts

The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts

A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory

The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About