Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts

Brockner, Joel; Rubin, Jeffrey Z.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-5072-2

Cited by 297 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Another important bias specifically relevant to the realm of conflict of interest is the tendency of people to escalate their commitment to a previous course of action (Brockner & Rubin, 1985;Staw, 1976). One question that has repeatedly been asked since the collapse of Enron is how Arthur Andersen ever signed off on Enron's accounting procedures.…”

Section: How Conflicts Of Interest Affect Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Moore

Tetlock

Tanlu

et al. 2006

AMR

510

392

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A series of financial scandals revealed a key weakness in the American business model: the failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true independence. We offer a two-tiered analysis of what went wrong. At the more micro tier, we advance moral seduction theory, explaining why professionals are often unaware of how morally compromised they have become by conflicts of interest. At the more macro tier, we offer issue-cycle theory, explaining why conflicts of interest of the sort that compromise major accounting firms are so pervasive.

show abstract

Section: How Conflicts Of Interest Affect Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Moore

Tetlock

Tanlu

et al. 2006

AMR

510

392

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…1987). For example, negotiators may fail because: (1) they are overconfident that their side is correct and would be chosen by an arbitrator , (2) they feel committed to a previous course of action and escalate their commitment in order to justify their current stance in the conflict (Brockner & Rubin, 1985: Staw, 1976, (3) the costs of settling are more salient than the costs of holding out (Neale,198A) , and/or (A) the negotiation is "framed" as losses rather than as gains (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985),…”

Section: Negotiator Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents

Carroll

Bazerman

Maury

1988

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Substantial evidence exists that negotiators frequently fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial outcomes. This paper provides a preliminary model of why these failures exist. We assume that negotiators are decision makers, and that their errors derive from cognitive processes ignored by utility-maximization theories. We focus on one part of the model: the systematic tendency to ignore the cognitions of opponent negotiators.Empirical evidence clarifying negotiators' cognitive processes is generated using verbal protocol techniques in a controlled negotiation task. The results show that subjects simplify the negotiation task, in part by ignoring contingencies introduced by the knowledge possessed by their opponents. The discussion focuses on how subjects simplify the task and how the decision making perspective helps redirect the negotiation literature. Page 2Two or more interdependent parties are negotiating if they are making joint decisions and do not have identical preferences across decision alternatives (Pruitt, 1981(Pruitt, , 1983 Kelley & Thibaut. 1980). Despite the obvious prevalence and importance of negotiation, substantial evidence exists that negotiators frequently fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial outcomes, and that these inefficiencies in the negotiation process reduce society's available resources, productivity, and creative opportunities, and increase society's conflict and self-destructiveness (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986;Raiffa, 1982). This paper provides a preliminary model of why these failures exist, based on the cognitive processes of negotiators. We focus on one part of the model: the systematic tendency to ignore the cognitions of opponent negotiators.Empirical evidence clarifying negotiator's cognitive processes is generated from verbal protocol methods used in the study of decision making. Negotiator RationalityNegotiation research has assumed the rationality of both outcomes and process . By rationality of outcomes we mean that an agreement will be reached if and only if there is a zone of agreement that both parties prefer over reaching impasse, and the agreement will be such that there is no alternative joint resolution available that would be preferable to both parties (Zuethen, 1930; isash, 1950;Cross, 1969;Farber, 1980Farber, , 1981.In contrast, ample empirical evidence has shown that individuals often fail to reach an agreement despite a positive zone of agreement, and often reach inefficient outcomes (cf. Pruitt and Rubin, 1986).By rationality of process we mean that negotiation researchers have has not directly assessed cognitions.Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) found that negotiators under an information disadvantage deviate from normative behavior by ignoring the information available to the opponent and, consequently, fall prey to the "winner's curse" -they consistently (and voluntarily) enter into Page 8 loss-making purchases.In one of their studies, subjects are given an opportunity to make one bid (take it or leave it) for the acqu...

show abstract

“…For a comprehensive review of these studies, see Bowen (1987). Entrapment research (see Brockner and Rubin 1985 for a summary) also provides evidence to support escalation bias.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Escalation Bias: Does it Extend to Marketing?

Armstrong

Coviello

Safranek³

1993

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Escalation bias implies that managers favor reinvestments in projects that are doing poorly over those doing well. We tested this implication in a marketing context by conducting experiments on advertising and product-design decisions. Each situation was varied to reflect either a long-term or a short-term decision. Besides these four conditions, we conducted three replications. We found little evidence of escalation bias by 365 subjects in the seven experimental comparisons. Comments Postprint version. Published in AbstractEscalation bias implies that managers favor reinvestments in projects that are doing poorly over those doing well. We tested this implication in a marketing context by conducting experiments on advertising and product-design decisions. Each situation was varied to reflect either a long-term or a short-term decision. Besides these four conditions, we conducted three replications. We found little evidence of escalation bias by 365 subjects in the seven experimental comparisons.

show abstract

Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts

Cited by 297 publications

References 0 publications

Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents

Escalation Bias: Does it Extend to Marketing?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About