Why do citizens (re-)elect leaders and parties that systematically undermine democratic institutions? Democratic backsliding is a process in which political leaders with authoritarian tendencies alter democratic checks and balances. Reforms of checks and balances can reshape and undermine existing democratic institutions and skew the political playing field in the advantage of authoritarian incumbents and their supporters. How do citizens respond to such reforms? In this article I study the effects of coalitional allegiance on (a) support for reforms and (b) motivations assigned to the reformers who propose to change checks and balances. Importantly, I study whether participants evaluate such reform proposals differently than other proposals. As reforms altering checks and balances pose a threat especially to the citizens in the opposition – their democratic rights might be constrained – the stakes in such reforms are high. I compare the checks and balances reforms to a simple administrative reform that does not have differential effects on citizens depending on their position vis-à-vis the government. I used a mixed-design survey experiment with a large sample (N = 1040) of Polish citizens. The results show that (1) the supporters of the ruling coalition evaluate all reforms through rose-colored glasses, whereas the opponents are more suspicious of potential violations of democratic rules; (2), the administrative reform was evaluated more positively and not seen as ill-intended, by contrast with the checks and balances reforms. All in all, this study indicates that even citizens, who find democratic institutions very important, see reforms of checks and balances differently depending on who proposes them. Overall, however, the reforms of checks and balances are not received with great enthusiasm of citizens.