Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiarversusno familiar: evidencia empírica en España

Abstract

Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar: evidencia empírica en España *The structure of the board of directors in family versus non-family fi rms: Empirical evidence in Spain RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la infl uencia de la dimensión cualitativa de la estructura de propiedad, en particular de la identidad familiar del accionista de control mayoritario, sobre la confi guración óptima del Consejo de Administración, así como el efecto que dicha confi guración tiene en la creación de valor de la organización. La técnica econométrica utilizada, el estimador de sistema del Método Generalizado de los Momentos, aplicada para un panel de empresas españolas familiares y no familiares cotizadas en el período 2001-2007, nos permite solventar el tradicional problema de endogeneidad presente en los estudios de gobierno corporativo. Los resultados obtenidos muestran las diferentes necesidades de supervisión y asesoramiento que tienen las empresas familiares con respecto a las de naturaleza no familiar y el consecuente efecto sobre las características estructurales y funcionales de sus consejos de administración. Entre las principales conclusiones encontramos que, a pesar de la creencia generalizada, los consejos pequeños e independientes no son siempre más efi cientes.ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the qualitative dimension of the ownership structure, in particular the family identity of the controlling shareholder, infl uences the optimal confi guration of the Board of Directors, as well as the effect that such confi guration has on fi rm value creation. The econometric technique used, the system estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments, applied to a panel of Spanish family and non-family listed companies in the period 2001-2007, allows us to solve the traditional problem of endogeneity existing in studies of corporate governance. The results show how the need for advising and monitoring depends on the family nature of the controlling shareholder and, therefore, the optimal structure of the Board of Directors differs between the two classes of companies under consideration. Among the main conclusions, we found that, contrary to the widespread believe, smaller and more independent boards are not always more effi cient. Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE FINANCIACIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD. Vol. XL, n.º 149 · enero-marzo 2011 ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE FINANCIACIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD. Vol. XL, n.º 149 · enero-marzo 2011

Board composition and performance in Spanish non-listed family firms: The influence of type of directors and CEO duality

“…Privately held family businesses are often used as vehicles for sustaining the family's transgenerational economic and socio-emotionalneeds (Bammens et al, 2011; García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011b). Families are actively involved not only in ownership, but also in the management of the firm (Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008; Westhead and Howorth, 2006).…”

“…Thus there is a high level of correspondence between managers and company owners. This means that the classical agency problem related to divergence of interests between principal and agent loses relevance (Chrisman et al, 2004; García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011a).…”

“…The variable related to board independence has received a great amount of attention in general literature on boards and it is the most addressed variable by the few articles focusing on boards in private family firms (see Appendix 1). Even though empirical evidence is not conclusive, it seems that recommendation on good governance tends to support the idea that outside boards are more efficient (García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011a). However, this may not be the case for family firms, and especially for non-listed ones (Arosa et al, 2010).…”

“…The review of the literature on boards and family firms shows that most empirical literature uses data of public family firms (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007; Chen and Hsu, 2009; García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011a,b; Lam and Lee, 2007; Leung et al, 2014; Prabowo and Simpson, 2011; San Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada, 2012) or uses combined samples of private and public family firms (e.g. Oswald et al, 2009).…”

CSR Disclosure: The IPO Case

“…In the literature, the most studied characteristics of boards of directors are independence, size, activity, and directors´participation in company ownership [42][43][44][45][46][47]. According to Spanish law, the composition of the board of directors should be balanced and equilibrated [48].…”