Ethnicity, capital formation, and conflict: evidence from Africa

Bates, Robert H.; Yackovlev, Irene

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511492600.012

Cited by 25 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Rather, fractionalisation, polarisation, as well as political institutions matter by a¤ecting the cost of con ‡ict for di¤erent groups in a collective action framework. 7 The creation and impact of ethnic identities is another important topic in the literature about ethnic con ‡ict (Basu, 2005;Sen, 2006 The present contribution will explain theoretically how group cleavages, i.e. fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation, favour or hinder the emergence of social tensions, which can to many respects be regarded as the opposite force to social cohesion and social capital, decreasing trust and civic collaboration.…”

Section: The Emergence Of Social Capitalmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…By contrast, Vanhanen (1999), Sambanis (2001) and Collier, Hoe-er and Rohner (2006) conclude, using other data sources and measures, that ethnic fractionalisation increases the risk of civil wars. 4 Cederman and Girardin (2007) and Bates (1999) explain the occurrence of con ‡ict with ethnonationalist exclusiveness, respectively one group's fear of permanent political exclusion.…”

Section: Ethnic Con ‡Ictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is shown that policing inside a group can ensure peaceful relations outside the group. 7 All these papers focus on aggregate players ("interest groups") rather than on individual players, and do not treat the respective e¤ects of ethnic polarisation, fractionalisation and segregation.…”

Section: Ethnic Con ‡Ictmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Rohner¹

2011

Journal of Development Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision. They can also be a driving force for more serious con ‡icts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, however, the emergence of social tensions has only rarely been studied in the literature. In the present contribution a gametheoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective e¤ects of fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation are assessed. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence on ethnic con ‡icts. The framework can also be applied to the study of social capital and merger failures.JEL Classi…cation: C73, D74, L14, Z13.

show abstract

Section: The Emergence Of Social Capitalmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Ethnic Con ‡Ictmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Rohner¹

2011

Journal of Development Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The debate has been recently revived with Vanhanen's (1999) article and book in which he tries to establish, on the basis of new data, a linear correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. Bates (Bates 1999), however, arrives at a curvilinear relationship for a sample of African countries. The same holds true for Collier and Hoeffler (2000) as well as de Soysa and Wagner (2003).…”

Section: Democracy and Ethnic Conflictmentioning

confidence: 96%

Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq

Wimmer

2003

Survival

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Designing democratic institutions in Iraq 13References 20 Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq SummaryHow can an escalation of tensions between the major ethno-religious groups be avoided in a democratizing Iraq? The first section explains why and under which conditions democratization may stir up, rather than palliate ethnic conflicts: when networks of civil society organizations have not yet developed and if the state is too weak and poor to be able to treat all citizens equally.The second section looks at the political history of Iraq, which is characterized by increasing fragmentation and conflict along ethnic lines. Pan-Arabism became the official state ideology and Shii, Kurds, Jews and Christians were excluded from positions of power and gradually driven out of the officers corps and the higher ranks of the administration. This Arabization of the Iraqi state was contested right from the beginning, as a review of the history of Kurdish and Shii uprisings will show. Throughout this history, the divisions along ethnoreligious lines have deepened. Cross-ethnic parties (such as the Communists) and organizations have split along these lines too. Rising levels of repression increasingly directed against the civilian population have further estranged Kurds, Shiis and Christians from the Iraqi state and bolstered support for their respective ethno-religious organizations.Elections are likely to stir up ethno-religious conflicts in the future, if democratic institutions are not designed to foster moderation and compromise. Several such designs are discussed in the last section and the following will be recommended: an electoral system that favors vote pooling across ethnic lines; federalism on a non-ethnic basis with a strong component of fiscal decentralization; a strong regime of minority rights and a judicial apparatus capable of enforcing the rule of law. Elections should come last, not first in the process of institutional transformation. International institutions can provide the legitimacy for the continued outside supervision and support that are needed, during years to come, to make democracy sustainable.

show abstract

“…Of course, officers are always talking about themselves using ethnic definitions and one can agree that modernity did not end ethnicity (Amselle and M'bokolo 1985;Bates 1999). But, as Bates differentiates ethnicity and violence, ethnicity and tribalism must also be differentiated.…”

Section: The Weight Of Collective Representation Against the Individumentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it Possible to Reform a Customs Administration? The Role of the Customs Elite on the Reform Process in Cameroon

Cantens¹

2012

The Role of Elites in Economic Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An ethnographic approach is applied to Cameroon customs in order to explore the role and the capacity of the bureaucratic elites to reform their institution. Fighting against corruption has led to the extraction and circulation of legal 'collective money' that fuels internal funds. This collective money is the core of the senior officers' power and authority, and materially grounds their elite status. Nevertheless, when reforming, wilful senior officers face a major problem. On the one hand, the onus is on them to improve governance and transparency, which can challenge the way they exert their authority. On the other hand, goodwill is not sufficient. 'Reformers' depend on a violent and unpredictable appointment process, driven by the political will to fight against corruption and the fact that the political authority has to keep a close eye on the customs apparatus that tends towards autonomy, thanks to its internal funds. Violence and collective representations weaken the legitimacy of the senior officers, even the reformers, by pushing individual skills into the background. This paper questions whether Cameroon's use of official customs data to evaluate individual performance can open up fissures among customs elites such that reformers are distinguished from others.

show abstract

Ethnicity, capital formation, and conflict: evidence from Africa

Cited by 25 publications

References 15 publications

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq

Is it Possible to Reform a Customs Administration? The Role of the Customs Elite on the Reform Process in Cameroon

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About