EU conciliation delegates: Responsible or runaway agents?

Abstract

This analysis tests the assumptions of the principal-agent model on delegation in EU conciliation processes and discusses the implications of the empirical results for the value of the model as a general framework of delegation. It shows that irresponsible behaviour by the EU conciliation committee is rare, contrary to the usual prediction of the principal-agent framework, because a series of the common assumptions of the model are not fulfilled. It is argued that, in a number of cases, the principal-agent model may still be relevant if some of its assumptions are endogenised into the model as characteristics of the environment, but that there may be other types of delegation where the core assumptions of the model do not apply. The findings are generated on the basis of different data sources such as official documents from the EU institutions, descriptive statistics and semi-structured interviews.

Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

“…Consequently, we do not consider a priori that diverging preferences between the principals and the agent are an assumption of the model nor a necessary condition to apply the model to a particular situation. It is more interesting and it is likely to provide more explanatory power when it is treated as a variable (Waterman and Meier 1998;rasmussen 2005;Elsig 2010;Conceição-Heldt 2011;Delreux 2011;Adriaensen 2016).…”

Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story

“…For example, there are scholars who examine PA relationships between an agent and multiple principals (e.g., Hawkins and Jacoby 2008;Nielson and Tierney 2003). Alternatively, there are contributions that analyze PA relationships between a principal(s) and multiple agents (e.g., Damro 2007;Klein 2010) while another prominent example is the analysis of chains of delegation (e.g., Dür and Elsig 2011;Rasmussen 2005).…”

Research Methods in European Union Studies

“…The studies either focus on the general picture of inter-institutional bargaining (e.g. Heritier, 2003, 2004;Rasmussen, 2005) or take the form of 'process tracing' case studies of particular legal acts, for example on the Advanced Therapies Regulation (Judge and Earnshaw, 2011) or the Directive of Biotechnical Innovation and Open Network Provision (Rittberger, 2000). Qualitative studies often focus more on the informal aspect of bargaining, arguing that many of the assumption of formal research are not fulfilled in real life (e.g.…”

“…actors are unitary, policy preferences are one dimensional) and emphasise the role and incentives of single negotiators in bargaining situations rather than the role of procedural rules. Rasmussen finds that EP representatives have more discretion in conciliation committees than Council representatives (Rasmussen, 2005).…”