Europeanisation and territorial representation in Italy

Devolution and EU policy-shaping: bridging the gap between multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism

“…This lag was almost non-existent concerning the UK devolved governments, where adjustment between the devolution and involvement levels was immediate (Bulmer et al ., 2002; Tatham, 2007b). In other cases, such as those of the Italian regions or the Spanish Autonomous Communities, the lag was greater, most probably because the European integration process was still largely underway at the time of devolution, and hence the pressure for matching devolution levels with involvement levels was initially weaker, but strengthened over time as integration deepened (Mabellini, 2005b; Fargion et al ., 2006: 764; Aldecoa and Cornago, 2009).…”

“…Though it is recognized that these non-institutional mechanisms do play a role, it is also argued that they are difficult to measure over 304 regions. Factors which might hinder or increase regional involvement, such as party political (in)congruence between the centre and its regions (Bauer, 2006: 34),7 pan-European regional networks and associations (Tatham, 2008: 508–509), the entrepreneurship of regional representatives (Jeffery, 2000: 14–16), personal chemistries and networks between state and regional élites, the role of issue saliency (Blatter et al ., 2008: 467; Tatham, 2008: 503), the compatibility of policy preference constellations, the embeddedness of regional executives in networks of private and public actors (Fargion et al ., 2006: 770–771), perceived legitimacy and social capital (Jeffery, 2000: 17), or socio-historical and cultural factors (Soldatos, 1990: 44–46), had to be excluded. Though often relevant, their occurrence and effect over 304 regions are either intractable or unsystematic.…”

Re‐Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy*

“…Significantly, the problems of pluralist policy‐making with only some of the people, together with the EU's policy without politics , even affects the sub‐national regional level in the case of EU programmes such as the structural funds. In southern Italy, for example, politicians are excluded from a consultation process that has created an ‘iron triangle’– between civil servants, consultants and interest groups – which is unaccountable (given the absence of politicians), opaque (since no one knows who is involved or what they are doing) and corrupt (as the EU accountants have recently discovered in Calabria, for example) (Fargion et al. , 2006a, 2006b).…”

Has the European Union empowered the regions? A pre- and post-Brexit preliminary investigation of the United Kingdom

“…Secondly, the theoretical framework provided by the SRA enables one to understand how actors and policy networks could better pursue specific interests at the EU level. Within the EU framework, they were offered options and ways to legitimate their position and to gain resources to improve the local economy and the very livelihood of citizens (especially true for Northern Ireland) to partly compensate for the disadvantages connected to UK centralisation (Bullmann, 1996; Fargion et al, 2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Finally, and more in general, through experience, project evaluations and direct participation in public political debates and EU policy-making processes, actors contributed to continuously improve the EU policy machinery.…”