2021
DOI: 10.1155/2021/9992163
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cross-Regional Coordinated Governance of Major Public Health Emergencies: The Example of the Spread of the COVID-19 Outbreak

Abstract: Cross-regional governance of government often faces various problems, which often brings great loss to the society. The global outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia (NCP) in early 2020 has not only caused serious economic and social losses to various countries but also put the current public health event governance system to a severe test. The cross-regional character and spillover effects of public health outbreak governance often make it difficult to coordinate cross-regional governance. In this contex… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
9
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 12 publications
(9 citation statements)
references
References 27 publications
0
9
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Scholars describe and depict the cooperation and game relationship between emergency management organizations based on the strategy types and evolution process in emergency management [33]. The vertical emergency game between the upper and lower governments [34]; the horizontal emergency game in crossregional government [35]; the game relationship between government, enterprises, and the public [36]; and the emergency cooperation game between the government and non-profit organizations [37] are important directions of the emergency cooperation game at the present stage. In addition, evolutionary game theory has made some progress in public health events [38], safety accidents [39], natural disasters [40], and other emergencies.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Scholars describe and depict the cooperation and game relationship between emergency management organizations based on the strategy types and evolution process in emergency management [33]. The vertical emergency game between the upper and lower governments [34]; the horizontal emergency game in crossregional government [35]; the game relationship between government, enterprises, and the public [36]; and the emergency cooperation game between the government and non-profit organizations [37] are important directions of the emergency cooperation game at the present stage. In addition, evolutionary game theory has made some progress in public health events [38], safety accidents [39], natural disasters [40], and other emergencies.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Taken to a higher level, namely cooperation, various problems arise when each actor begins to pursue individual targets which are the main performance indicators for each organization. (Hsieh et al, 2021;Xiao et al, 2021). Although the actors realize that long-term relationships will have considerable benefits, the relationships found in this study tend to be short-term relationships with relatively lower risks.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…In a disaster situation, an effort is needed to collaborate, coordinate and cooperate between government organizations and the community (Hsieh, Wang, Wong, & Ho, 2021;Liu et al, 2021;Xiao, Peng, & Xu, 2021). This raises questions as well as debates about how the three are carried out whether using a centralized or decentralized approach.…”
Section: Coordination Cooperation and Collaboration In Disaster Situa...mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In this study, we draw on evolutionary game theory in order to describe the interactions between emergency organizations in the cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. In recent years, evolutionary game theory has also been applied and developed in emergency management problems [ 47 , 48 ], such as the prevention and control of public health emergencies [ 49 , 50 ], government safety supervision [ 51 ], guiding emergency mass evacuation [ 52 ], government emergency mobilization [ 53 ], and emergency handling strategies of engineering construction [ 54 ]. The dynamic decision-making mechanism of different emergency organizations has been examined based on the strategy types and evolution process of participants in emergency management.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%