The aims of the present study were to obtain the seafood dietary patterns of coastal residents, to determine the concentrations of heavy metals, and to evaluate the possible health risks caused by seafood intake. The daily food intakes of 24 types of seafood were collected from 738 participants from Xiamen, a southern Chinese coastal city, using food frequency questionnaire (FFQ) and dietary history method. One hundred and fifty-six samples of 14 types of highest intake seafood were collected from local markets for lead (Pb), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), mercury (Hg), and arsenic (As) determination. Health risks via seafood consumption were evaluated by calculating the target hazard quotient (THQ) and the total hazard index (HI) for carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic effects recommended by the US Environmental Protection Agency. The results showed that the seafood daily intake of Xiamen residents was 61.5 (2.14, 115) g/day. The concentrations of Pb, Cd, Cr, Hg, and As in seafood were ND-0.45 mg/kg, ND-0.19 mg/kg, ND-0.80 mg/kg, ND-0.70 mg/kg, and 0.32-16.9 mg/kg, respectively. Concentrations of Cd and As in some samples were higher than national limitation standards. Consumption of 14 common types of seafood would not pose non-carcinogenic risk. However, some types, such as sparuslatus, oyster, and porphyra tenera, would form a carcinogenic risk. Regardless of a carcinogenic or non-carcinogenic risk, As posed the highest risk on humans. The observed HI value for non-carcinogenic effect of all metals in all seafood reached 0.69-2.20, and the metal orders of risk can be listed as As > Hg > Cr > Cd > Pb, reiterating the risk of As is a matter of concern in seafood from Xiamen markets.

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Cross-regional governance of government often faces various problems, which often brings great loss to the society. The global outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia (NCP) in early 2020 has not only caused serious economic and social losses to various countries but also put the current public health event governance system to a severe test. The cross-regional character and spillover effects of public health outbreak governance often make it difficult to coordinate cross-regional governance. In this context, this paper adopts a regional evolutionary game analysis framework and studies the cross-regional governance of public health emergencies by constructing a symmetric game of peripheral regions and an asymmetric game of core-peripheral regions. The marginal contribution of this paper is to attempt to construct a symmetric game model for peripheral regions and an asymmetric game model for core and peripheral regions using an evolutionary game approach to study the behavioral strategies of multiple regions in the governance of public health emergencies, and it is found that when the regional spillover effects and governance costs are small or the economic and social damages caused by public health emergencies are large, all regions will choose to conduct coordinated governance. Otherwise, there will be regions that choose to “free-ride.” This “free-rider” mentality has led to the failure in achieving good cross-regional collaborative governance of public health emergencies, resulting in a lack of efficiency in the overall governance of public health in society. However, when the spillover effect of regional governance exceeds a certain critical value, the result of the regional governance game is also the socially optimal result, when public health emergencies are effectively governed. At the same time, the relevant findings and analytical framework of this paper will provide a policy reference for the cross-regional governance of the current new crown epidemic.

The rapid development of coastal urban agglomerations in China has gained global attention since the 1980s. Recently, several regions in the Central China have also experienced rapid economic development. The objectives of this paper are to explore whether the spatial pattern of urban growth in Central China's urban agglomerations is the same as those costal ones and whether it is driven by anything other than external forces. Using the Changzhutan region as an example, this study analyses the economic transformation and spatial restructuring of the populations in urban agglomerations in Central China and explores the driving factors of urban growth using regression models. We find that most of the population is concentrated in prefecture‐level city districts and county seats, which is markedly different from the large‐scale regional population agglomerations found in the coastal urban agglomerations. Domestic investment, instead of foreign investment, and human capital, has become important factors driving the population migration. This finding sharply contrasts with the pattern found in coastal urban agglomerations, where regional concentrations of the population and economic activities are primarily driven by labour‐intensive and global economies. This case study may serve as a basis for future urban planning and management in Central China.

Background: The sharing and utilization of online users' information has become an important resource for governments to manage COVID-19; however, it also involves the risk of leakage of users' personal information. Online users' sharing decisions regarding personal information and the government's COVID-19 prevention and control decisions influence each other and jointly determine the efficiency of COVID-19 control and prevention.Method: Using the evolutionary game models, this paper examines the behavioral patterns of online users and governments with regard to the sharing and disclosure of COVID-19 information for its prevention and control.Results: This paper deduce the reasons and solutions underlying the contradiction between the privacy risks faced by online users in sharing information and COVID-19 prevention and control efforts. The inconsistency between individual and collective rationality is the root cause of the inefficiency of COVID-19 prevention and control.Conclusions: The reconciliation of privacy protection with COVID-19 prevention and control efficiency can be achieved by providing guidance and incentives to modulate internet users' behavioral expectations.