Evolutionary game analysis of decision-making dynamics of local governments and residents during wildfires

Shi, Wei; Wang, Haizhong; Chen, Chen; Kong, Zhaojun

doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101991

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Under the Chinese administrative system, the local government assumes the executor role, is responsible for the actual implementation of the CG mechanism, and is supervised by the central government. Due to political responsibilities and interests, the local government may actively implement CG and build an orderly collaborative relationship with the public in the aspects of personnel, materials, and funds (Shi et al., 2021). The public is an important part of the emergency collaboration and can express their opinions and suggestions through formal and informal channels.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Model From a Value Perception Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Chen,

Liu,

Tadikamalla

et al. 2023

Risk Analysis

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In a risk society, the survival and development of humans are facing threats of complex and severe public crisis events. Public participation in collaborative governance (CG) of public crisis events is increasingly recognized as an important direction for the reform of the current and future emergency management system. Previous studies of CG have mainly focused on the macro level and ignored to address micro‐level discussions of the behavioral strategy evolution of stakeholders. From a fresh value perception perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model to clarify the evolution mechanism of multi‐level emergency CG. First, the value perception model is built based on Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting to optimize the traditional game matrix. Second, the evolutionary stability is analyzed to solve the system evolution law. Finally, numerical simulation is conducted in the case of Heilongjiang province, a main region of food and energy supply in China. Results showed that (1) the CG game system has a complex evolutionary path; (2) the behavior of game players is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs; (3) compared with the reference value and the risk aversion coefficient of income accounts, game players are more sensitive to that of cost accounts; (4) enhancing the perceived value of public psychological satisfaction and government reputation is helpful for the long‐term construction of CG. Overall, this study aims to highlight the potential utility of value perception in promoting effective implementations of CG and to provide new insights for the development of CG in China and other countries.

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Section: Evolutionary Game Model From a Value Perception Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Chen,

Liu,

Tadikamalla

et al. 2023

Risk Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, Liu uses the replicator equation to analyze the game between a coal mine regulator and two coal mining enterprises [29]. According to the replication dynamic equation in the evolutionary game theory [30][31][32][33][34][35], we can construct a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of a local government, a construction enterprise, and a construction worker. The model construction process is as follows:…”

Section: Model Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to 𝑑𝑥/𝑑𝑡 = 0, 𝑑𝑦/𝑑𝑡 = 0, and 𝑑𝑧/𝑑𝑡 = 0, the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game model can be obtained as follows: (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,1), (0,1,0), (0,0,1), (0,0,0). The stability of the equilibrium point can be analyzed using the Jacobi matrix [30][31][32][33][34][35]. The Jacobi matrix corresponding to the evolutionary game model is as follows:…”

Section: Model Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

2022

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The violation behavior of construction workers is an important cause of construction accidents. To reduce the violations of construction workers and to stimulate the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper. Then, the behavior choice mechanism of each player is analyzed. Finally, an incentive effect analysis method is put forward, and the incentive effects of different tax incentive mechanisms are analyzed. This research finds that only when the safety punishment imposed on construction workers is large enough does the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises encourage construction workers to choose not to violate the regulation. Increasing the tax rate of a construction enterprise in the case of accidents can encourage the construction enterprise to supervise, but it inhibits the supervision behavior of the local government. A numerical simulation verifies the effectiveness of the incentive effect analysis method, which provides a new method for the incentive effect analysis of incentive mechanisms.

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“…In practice, "simple care, in-home care" is more suitable for families with less severe disability, and is more like an initial stage in the development of long-term care. In this combination, the cost of care at home is relatively low, so the care services demand is not very high, and "in-home care" can already meet the patient's needs [31][32][33]. For care institutions, there is also a preference for the "simple care" strategy, as the demand is low, and the provision of "professional care" may be priced out of the market (see Figure 7).…”

Section: Cost and Time Required Of Home Carementioning

confidence: 99%

Long-Term Care Services and Insurance System in China: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Zhang

2022

Sustainability

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The study creates a simplified game model to propose a suitable policy to foster a win-win scenario between care institutions and families of the disabled elderly , and to give a reference basis for enhancing the welfare level of the disabled elderly as well as the commercial performance of care institutions. First, we study and synthesise the experiences of contemporary Chinese long-term care pilot cities to offer data for subsequent numerical analysis; second, we create an evolutionary game model to depict the conflicts and evolving patterns of conflicts between the disabled elderly and care facilities in China; and third, we use numerical analysis to investigate the effects of internal factors (cost of care, price of care) and policy assistance (government subsidies). Finally, we utilise numerical analysis to investigate how internal factors (cost of care, price of care) and policy assistance (government subsidy) affect the combination of solutions. The study reveals that (1) the two-sided strategic choices of care institutions and disabled families make the game unstable. (2) The government can influence the choice of care institutions and disabled families by tax rates and subsidies, implying a stability policy. (3) The presence of an evolutionary stabilization strategy implies that government control may have a desirable limit. When government engagement in this market is limited, “professional care, home care” finally becomes the evolutionary stability method.

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Evolutionary game analysis of decision-making dynamics of local governments and residents during wildfires

Cited by 18 publications

References 58 publications

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

Long-Term Care Services and Insurance System in China: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

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