Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

Poncela, Julia; Gómez‐Gardeñes, Jesús; Traulsen, Arne; Moreno, Yamir

doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/8/083031

Cited by 139 publications

(100 citation statements)

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“…The emergence of cooperation and the phase transitions leading to other favorable evolutionary outcomes depend sensitively on the structure of the interaction network and the type of interactions, as well as on the number and type of competing strategies [32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45]. Studies making use of statistical physics and network science have led to significant advances in our understanding of the evolution of cooperation, for example by expanding our understanding of the role of heterogeneity of interaction networks [35,46], the dynamical organization of cooperation [38] and population growth [47], the emergence of hierarchy among competing individuals [39], as well as the intriguing role of strategic complexity [41,43], to name just some examples. Most recently, evidence in support of the fact that static networks promote cooperation in human experiments have also been presented [48], in addition to the fact that this has been shown already before for networks with rewiring [49].…”

Section: Collective Behavior and Evolutionary Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networks of networks – An introduction

Kenett

Perc

Boccaletti

2015

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

144

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Section: Collective Behavior and Evolutionary Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networks of networks – An introduction

Kenett

Perc

Boccaletti

2015

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

144

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“…Since it not only reflects the evolving of strategies over time, but also characterizes the adaptive development of the network topologies or the update rules (for a further review see [33]). For instance, in [34][35][36] the rewiring of existing links was recognized as very beneficial to the evolution of cooperation, the growth of a network had a positive p-1 impact on the evolution of cooperation in [41][42][43], and cooperation could also be promoted when the coevolution of strategies and update rules were considered [44,45]. Take some multinational corporations as examples, these corporations often extend their business to different countries or regions to pursue their maximal profit.…”

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confidence: 99%

Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game

Zhang

Liu

Wang

et al. 2011

EPL

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Abstract. -In this Letter, we introduce an aspiration-induced reconnection mechanism into the spatial public goods game. A player will reconnect to a randomly chosen player if its payoff acquired from the group centered on the neighbor does not exceed the aspiration level. We find that an intermediate aspiration level can best promote cooperation. This optimal phenomenon can be explained by a negative feedback effect, namely, a moderate level of reconnection induced by the intermediate aspiration level induces can change the downfall of cooperators, and then facilitate the fast spreading of cooperation. While insufficient reconnection and excessive reconnection induced by low and high aspiration levels respectively are not conductive to such an effect. Moreover, we find that the intermediate aspiration level can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of degree, which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation.

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“…The choice of τ D /τ T < 1 leads to a situation in which cooperation and defection cannot coexist as the system dynamics evolves either to an all-C or to all-D configuration. Other rules for nodes attachment and evolutionary dynamics might change both the topological and dynamical features of the system [27]. We stress that our main goal is to show that there are networks for which defector hubs can be asymptotically stable, for which it is enough to find one network generation recipe.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cooperative scale-free networks despite the presence of defector hubs

et al. 2009

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PACS 89.75.Fb -Structures and organization in complex systems PACS 87.23.Kg -Dynamics of evolution PACS 89.65.-s -Social and economic systems Abstract -Recent results have shown that heterogeneous populations are better suited to support cooperation than homogeneous settings when the Prisoner's Dilemma drives the evolutionary dynamics of the system. The same occurs when the network growth is coevolving together with the evolutionary dynamics, which also gives rise to highly cooperative scale-free networks. In the latter case, however, the organization of cooperation is radically different with respect to the case in which the underlying network is static. In this paper we study the structure of cooperation in static networks grown together with evolutionary dynamics and show that the general belief that hubs can only be occupied by cooperators does not hold. Moreover, these scale-free networks support high levels of cooperation despite having defector hubs. Our results have several important implications for the explanation of cooperative behavior in scale-free networks and highlight the importance that the formation of complex systems have on its function.Evolutionary dynamics [1] has attracted a lot of interest in the physics community lately, in particular in the context of evolutionary games on graphs [2,3]. This is a most relevant problem both from the physics viewpoint as well as from its applications. Indeed, evolutionary games describe a local optimization dynamics, which is largely different from the hamiltonian dynamics that is the traditional physics paradigm. On the other hand, these problems are related to important biological and socioeconomical issues, such as the emergence of cooperation [4].To date, a great deal of work has been done on evolutionary game dynamics on fixed networks (see, e.g., [2] and references therein). Beginning with the pioneering work by Nowak and May [5], much research has focused on whether the chances of establishing cooperative behavior (if not global, at least to a large extent) are improved by (a)

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Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

Cited by 139 publications

References 50 publications

Networks of networks – An introduction

Networks of networks – An introduction

Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game

Cooperative scale-free networks despite the presence of defector hubs

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