Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

Zhang, Jianlei

doi:10.1140/epjb/e2015-60101-y

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Some further theoretical analyses on the evolution of cooperation have been achieved since the introduction of evolutionary dynamics in both infinite and finite populations [4,6,[11][12][13]. Within the area of dynamics, two-player games [14][15][16] are frequently adopted to model typical pairwise interactions to understand the evolution of cooperation [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]. Considering the ubiquitously group interactions ranging from the natural world to human society, researchers recently generalized two-player games to their multiplayer versions [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37], such as the N -person prisoner's dilemma [30,38], N-person snowdrift game [31,32], N -person stag hunt game [39], as well as the N -person ultimatum game [40].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Broom

et al. 2016

Phys. Rev. E

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The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions, population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators. Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Broom

et al. 2016

Phys. Rev. E

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“…Imitation dynamics, such as the pairwise comparison, is the commonly used updating rule, which has been recently studied by numerous works [26,27,[30][31][32]. Moreover, the role of aspiration as an important endogenous feature of individuals has also received a lot of attention for the fact that aspiration-driven strategy update is commonly observed in studies of animal and human behavioural ecology [29,33].…”

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confidence: 99%

Cooperation guided by the coexistence of imitation dynamics and aspiration dynamics in structured populations

Cong

et al. 2017

EPL

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In the framework of the evolutionary game theory, two fundamentally different mechanisms, the imitation process and the aspiration-driven dynamics, can be adopted by players to update their strategies. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer, while in the latter case individuals change their strategies based on a comparison of payoffs they collect in the game to their own aspiration levels. Here we explore how cooperation evolves for the coexistence of these two dynamics. Intriguingly, cooperation reaches its lowest level when a certain moderate fraction of individuals pick aspiration-level–driven rule while the others choose pairwise comparison rule. Furthermore, when individuals can adjust their update rules besides their strategies, either imitation dynamics or aspiration-driven dynamics will finally take over the entire population, and the stationary cooperation level is determined by the outcome of competition between these two dynamics. We find that appropriate synergetic effects and moderate aspiration level boost the fixation probability of aspiration-driven dynamics most effectively. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the coexistence of imitation dynamics and aspiration dynamics in the society.

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“…Liu [18] studied the supervision in China's coal mine safety and built an evolutionary game model between government and coal mining industry. Zhang [19] used evolutionary games to provide solutions for cooperative dilemma in multi-agent system with different memory capacity. Fan [20] used evolutionary game theory to analyze the problems of mobile payment business model by assuming that the mobile operators and the financial institutions in mobile payment industrial chain are limited rational game themes.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

Guan

Zhang

Liu

et al. 2016

Filomat

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China's current vehicle emissions caused by air pollution problems have become increasingly prominent. How to improve new energy vehicle market share, and effectively guide the consumer buying behavior become a problem, which the government and social have to be solved. In this paper, according to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model between the government and consumers in the car market, introducing of random factors analysis on the impact of evolutionary stability ,will obtain the stable strategy of government and automotive consumers. And on the basis of it, we study the government support, cost of vehicles, the use of cost, the utility of automobile use for the ways of evolutionary stability, with case further illustrates the external disturbance factors on consumer purchase of new energy vehicles in evolutionary game process stability. Studies show that: the increasing government subsidy policy, the reducing life cycle costs of new energy vehicles and the improving effectiveness of new energy vehicles will lead the model's evolution to the orientation of consumer purchasing new energy vehicles.

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Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

Cited by 9 publications

References 46 publications

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Cooperation guided by the coexistence of imitation dynamics and aspiration dynamics in structured populations

The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

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