2016
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.93.042304
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Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

Abstract: Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case. We show that the outcome is in fact strongly dependent on the distance of separation … Show more

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Cited by 101 publications
(62 citation statements)
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“…Thus, each time we are faced with the choice of either cooperating or defecting, we should also take into account what we risk to loose as individuals, and what we are striving for. In the realm of these considerations, evolutionary multigames [69,[285][286][287] appear as a promising mathematical foundation for properly taking into account such upgrades to existing models. Alternatives to imitation dynamics, such as myopic best response microscopic dynamics [204,205,207] and its variants [215], also merit more research in the realm of the public goods game, in particular as they are more akin to an innovative analysis of a particular situation and thus useful to model human behavior.…”
Section: Future Research and Outlookmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, each time we are faced with the choice of either cooperating or defecting, we should also take into account what we risk to loose as individuals, and what we are striving for. In the realm of these considerations, evolutionary multigames [69,[285][286][287] appear as a promising mathematical foundation for properly taking into account such upgrades to existing models. Alternatives to imitation dynamics, such as myopic best response microscopic dynamics [204,205,207] and its variants [215], also merit more research in the realm of the public goods game, in particular as they are more akin to an innovative analysis of a particular situation and thus useful to model human behavior.…”
Section: Future Research and Outlookmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…continuous and reversible, in complex networks' structure and dynamics, the synchronizing process rather reminds first-order (discontinuous and irreversible) transitions [19]. For evolutionary games in multiplex network, interactions between layers influence evolution of cooperation [20][21][22]. Researchers found spreading dynamics on multiplex network also behaves distinctively from the single-layer network [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the present example draws on spatial evolutionary games and should be of interest to contemporary statistical physics research on the subject [48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63], the concept of stability of subsystem solutions in agent-based models goes far beyond disciplinary boundaries. Whether agents are humans, firms, ants, or ecological entities, whenever more than two states compete in a structured population (represented by a lattice or a network), the stability of subsystem solutions is crucial for a correct and relevant analysis.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%