2021
DOI: 10.1137/20m1353629
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Existence Results for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems under Continuity-Like Properties of Sublevel Sets

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Cited by 11 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Let us now give the definition of a "regularity-type" property, inspired from [25] and [20], on the couple of maps (T, K) defining the perturbed variational inequalities considered in this section. Definition 5.1 The couple (T, K) of set-valued maps, with T : X × Λ ⇒ X * and K : U → X will be said to be int-dually lower semicontinuous on X 2 ×Λ× U if for all sequence (y n , z n , λ n , µ n ) n converging to (y, z, λ, µ) ∈ X 2 × Λ × U with y ∈ int K(µ), z ∈ K(µ) and, for any n, y…”
Section: Stability Of Local Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Let us now give the definition of a "regularity-type" property, inspired from [25] and [20], on the couple of maps (T, K) defining the perturbed variational inequalities considered in this section. Definition 5.1 The couple (T, K) of set-valued maps, with T : X × Λ ⇒ X * and K : U → X will be said to be int-dually lower semicontinuous on X 2 ×Λ× U if for all sequence (y n , z n , λ n , µ n ) n converging to (y, z, λ, µ) ∈ X 2 × Λ × U with y ∈ int K(µ), z ∈ K(µ) and, for any n, y…”
Section: Stability Of Local Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As observed in [20], considering regularity conditions on the couple (T, K) instead of on each map T and K separately, as classically done, allows to weaken the hypotheses used to prove some stability results for the solution maps.…”
Section: Stability Of Local Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to quote that the existence of such equilibria cannot be guarantee here neither by classical Arrow-Debreu existence result for generalized Nash equilibrium problem (see [1]) nor by the more recent one (see [2]). Indeed, given a vector F −i , the function…”
Section: Defining the Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is known that when the preference relation is represented by a concave utility function the generalized Nash game can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality problem, see [3][4][5][6][7]. This reformulation was extended to the quasiconcave case, due to the concept of the normal cone in [6,8,9].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is known that when the preference relation is represented by a concave utility function the generalized Nash game can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality problem, see [3][4][5][6][7]. This reformulation was extended to the quasiconcave case, due to the concept of the normal cone in [6,8,9]. On the other hand, recently, Milasi et al [10], used the variational approach to guarantee the existence of solutions for a competitive economic equilibrium problem, where the consumer preferences are given through a binary relation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%