Explaining IMF Lending Decisions After the Cold War

Abstract

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IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention

“…Consistent with the major evidence in the literature (Barro & Lee, 2005;Cornelius, 1987;Knight & Santaella, 1997;Moser & Sturm, 2011;Sturm et al, 2005;Vreeland, 2003), a shortage of official reserve significantly increases the likelihood of entering a loan agreement with the Fund. However, we also find that larger loans are agreed with countries with relatively more reserves, as it indicates a more prudent macroeconomic management by governments in charge and a greater sustainability of the current macroeconomic environment.…”

“…However, the existing literature underlines that the contribution of some of the main explanatory variables of IMF lending might be different between countries with and without access to concessional loans and between lowand middle-income countries (Bal-Gunduz, 2009;Bird & Rowlands, 2009a;Moser & Sturm, 2011). Given the limited sample size, we do not report sub-sample estimates, but we test our main results about the crisis hypothesis interacting the CRISIS and the FRIEND G7 variables with two sets of dummies.…”

Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth

“…13 (2) The second reason which may affect multilateral lending is to concede a preferential treatment to allies of major shareholders of International Financial Institutions (IFI). There is substantial empirical evidence linking a country's geopolitical proximity to the Fund's major shareholders with a variety of types of preferential treatment (e.g., Thacker 1999; Barro and Lee 2005;Dreher and Jensen 2007;Dreher et al 2008Dreher et al , 2009aStone 2008;Moser and Sturm 2011). 14 The influence of political aspects on the World Bank has been less investigated, still there is some evidence documenting their impact in programs' participation and credit allocation (e.g., Dreher et al 2009b;Kaja and Werker 2010;Kilby 2009).…”

“…17 SeeVaubel (1986).18 The extreme bounds analysis performed byMoser and Sturm (2011) also shows that participation in an IMF program is related to a country's persistent involvement with the IMF.…”

Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case

“…3 The assignment of contributions/votes, however, is really a political 1 The literature is vast. References that have particularly influenced this study include: Bearce and Tirone (2010), Bermeo (2008), Biglaiser and DeRouen (2010), Broz and Hawes (2006), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007), Dreher et al (2009Dreher et al ( , 2010, Dunning (2004), Easterly (2006), Hawkins et al (2006), Isopi and Mattesini (2010), Kilby (2006Kilby ( , 2009Kilby ( , 2011, Kuziemko and Werker (2006), Lancaster (2008), Marchesi and Missale (2004), McKeown (2010), Milner and Tingley (2010), Moser and Sturm (2011), Mosley et al (1991), Oatley and Yackee (2004), and Schneider and Tobin (2010). For work on small donors, see Neumayer (2003a, b).…”