EU Socio-Economic Governance Since the Crisis 2018
DOI: 10.4324/9781351025621-7
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Explaining the evolving role of national parliaments under the European Semester

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Cited by 10 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…Although an increasing number of studies have examined how fiscal governance reforms at the European level came about (Ioannou et al, ; Laffan and Schlosser, ) and how to interpret their nature within the framework of EU integration (Dawson, ; Fabbrini, ; Schimmelfennig, ), there has been limited research on how these reforms have actually influenced budget processes and practices in the member states. While some studies have discussed the resulting increased role of the European Commission in EU economic and fiscal governance (Bauer and Becker, ) and the impacts of these reforms on national parliaments (Crum, : Dawson, ; Hallerberg et al, ), no comparative studies have systematically examined the effects of these reforms on the budgetary processes of member states. As the eventual impact of the European fiscal governance reforms depends on how they affect budgetary processes in member states, it is important to understand what kind of domestic changes they have triggered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although an increasing number of studies have examined how fiscal governance reforms at the European level came about (Ioannou et al, ; Laffan and Schlosser, ) and how to interpret their nature within the framework of EU integration (Dawson, ; Fabbrini, ; Schimmelfennig, ), there has been limited research on how these reforms have actually influenced budget processes and practices in the member states. While some studies have discussed the resulting increased role of the European Commission in EU economic and fiscal governance (Bauer and Becker, ) and the impacts of these reforms on national parliaments (Crum, : Dawson, ; Hallerberg et al, ), no comparative studies have systematically examined the effects of these reforms on the budgetary processes of member states. As the eventual impact of the European fiscal governance reforms depends on how they affect budgetary processes in member states, it is important to understand what kind of domestic changes they have triggered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hallerberg et al. () state this most clearly: “An intention of the European Semester was to increase co‐ordination across the Euro Area. Scrutiny of member state‐specific recommendations would put pressure on governments to adopt the recommendations, or at least to respond to them.…”
Section: Executive Dominance Sidelining Of Representative Assembliesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As remarked above, all these authors tend to equate "ownership" with "scrutiny" and expect national parliaments to scrutinize national executives' activities in fulfillment of the agreements entered into since the creation of EMU and reinforced during the Euro crisis. Hallerberg et al (2018) state this most clearly: "An intention of the European Semester was to increase co-ordination across the Euro Area. Scrutiny of member state-specific recommendations would put pressure on governments to adopt the recommendations, or at least to respond to them.…”
Section: Policy Ownership and Learningmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Concerning national parliaments, their involvement in EU economic governance has improved (see Fromage and van den Brink 2018), albeit the form and degree of involvement in Semester processes varies considerably across Member States. Hallerberg, Marzinotto, and Wolff (2018) stipulate that budgetary committees have become more active while parliaments in Member States outside the eurozone engage more in the monitoring of CSRs' implementation. In total, however, even when parliaments acquired greater oversight rights, they did so 'only in the lower ranges of accountability mechanisms (information, consultation and debate)', whereas only the Latvian parliament acquired hard competencies to approve or amend the Stability Programme (Crum, 2018, p. 275).…”
Section: The Semester and Throughout Legitimacymentioning
confidence: 99%