Exploring the impact of employment policy measures in the context of crisis: The case of Greece

Abstract

The article addresses the economic, social and political dimensions of the Greek work-welfare nexus in the context of the recent financial crisis. Explaining the main social protection and activation measures before and during the crisis (a reduction in salaries and in the purchasing power of employees partnered with unemployment benefits, contribution subsidies for employers, training and work-practice vouchers, and fixed-term quasi-employment in community services), analysis is offered of the impacts of these. The article concludes that employment measures in Greece are not only residual and inadequate to meet the needs of the unemployed but have not curbed rising unemployment rates.

Effect of Welfare and Employment Policies on the Correlation between Migration and Unemployment

“…Furthermore, policy measures taken in Greece at the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, including among other things reducing workers' pay in the public sector, the diminished purchasing power of employees, providing unemployment pay, awarding subsidies to employers, and more, were not consistent with the needs of the unemployed, and thus unsurprisingly had no real effect on the rising unemployment (Dimoulas, 2014). Hence, this inefficient welfare and employment policy was widely criticized for not offering the necessary tools to handle the real challenges needed to develop the Greek employment market (Matsaganis, 2011;Matsaganis, 2012).…”

Youth‐oriented active labour market policies and economic crisis: Explaining policy effort in Greece and Portugal

“…On the eve of the crisis, the Greek labour market was characterized by a high degree of segmentation due to highly restrictive employment protection legislation (EPL), low mobility, low employment protection for young workers, constraints in the introduction of flexible forms of employment and high non‐wage labour costs (social contributions, taxes), which encouraged informal and, in some cases, even illegal employment especially in the youth labour market (Seferiades, ). Unemployment benefits were very limited and offered income protection mainly to seasonal workers (Dimoulas, , p. 52). Τhe number of beneficiaries was less than a fifth of the registered unemployed population (Dimoulas, ), and there was little social assistance, especially for young workers without contribution records (Matsaganis et al, , pp.…”

“…Unemployment benefits were very limited and offered income protection mainly to seasonal workers (Dimoulas, , p. 52). Τhe number of beneficiaries was less than a fifth of the registered unemployed population (Dimoulas, ), and there was little social assistance, especially for young workers without contribution records (Matsaganis et al, , pp. 643–645).…”

Nonstandard forms of employment in Greece during the crisis: Challenges, risks, and prospects

“…After the end of the WWII, Greece saw the integration of European‐style state institutions with its traditional culture of clientelism and favoritism (Dimoulas, , p. 50; Petmesidou, ). In this context, the Greek political economy was shaped around a mix of capitalist logic, the eastern Mediterranean culture of clientelism and interpermeable relationships between state services and private economy (Dimoulas, , p. 50; Petmesidou, ). The system of production centered on small family firms, medium sized enterprises and self‐employment, while family remained responsible for social emergency help, undertaking many tasks that the welfare state shoulder elsewhere (Papadopoulos & Roumpakis, , p. 9; Tinios, , p. 13).…”

“…Although social spending rose from 19.9–26% for the period 1995–2008 and was then near the EU‐15 average of 27.5%, the risk of poverty after social benefits remained one of the highest in the EU, at a rate from 20 to 21% (Papatheodorou & Dafermos, ). Unemployment benefits were very limited and offered income protection to seasonal works in the tourist sector, to workers in construction, education, and local authorities (Dimoulas, , p. 52).…”