Factive Phenomenal Characters*

Hellie, Benj

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00128.x

Cited by 23 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…6 6 It is worth noting that this use of introspection allows for introspective determination of a highly theoretical conclusion. Benj Hellie (Hellie, 2006, 2007) makes the reasoning explicit (2007, p. 267): “If a judgment ascribes a property to an experience, and that judgment is the result of expert phenomenological study under ideal circumstances, then that property is among the experience's phenomenal characters.” Ideal circumstances are familiar: not drunk, taken time, etc. Anyone who has read the writings of the highly trained expert practitioners of introspectionist psychology of the 19 th Century such as Wundt and Külpe will be reluctant to accept such a principle.…”

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confidence: 99%

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹

Block

2010

Philosophical Issues

116

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Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception-what it is like to perceive-in a non-mentalistic way-that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness-or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by what one is directly aware of or by representational content are instances of what Gilbert Harman has called "mental paint" (Block, 1990;Harman, 1990). The claim of this paper is that empirical facts about attention point in the direction of mental paint. The argument starts with the claim (later modified) that when one moves one's attention around a scene while keeping one's eyes fixed, the phenomenology of perception can change in ways that do not reflect which qualities of objects one is directly aware of or the way the world is represented to be. These changes in the phenomenology of perception cannot be accounted for in terms of awareness of or representation of the focus of attention because they manifest themselves in experience as differences in apparent contrast, apparent color saturation, apparent size, apparent speed, apparent time of occurrence and other appearances. There is a way of coping with these phenomena in terms of vague contents, but vague contents cannot save direct realism or representationism because the kind of vagueness required clashes wth the phenomenology itself.

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confidence: 99%

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹

Block

2010

Philosophical Issues

116

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“…is that naïve realism may better account for the distinctively presentational character of perceptual experience than its competitors (Hellie 2007;Fish 2009). In thought, we have things in mind only virtually, in their absence, by re-presenting them.…”

Section: Motivating Naïve Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Bower

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.

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“…From P1-P3, we can conclude that seeing e a concrete object x is a matter of visually experiencing x, where visually experiencing is a relation. This is 13 Proponents of this view include Snowdon (1980), Child (1992), Langsam (1997), Campbell (2002), Martin (2004Martin ( , 2006, Hellie (2007Hellie ( , 2010, Sturgeon (2008), Fish (2009), Brewer (2007), Schellenberg (2010Schellenberg ( , 2011Schellenberg ( , 2014Schellenberg ( , 2016, Logue (2011Logue ( , 2012, and Genone (2014, forthcoming). The disjunctivism of Hinton (1967) is an important precursor.…”

Section: P3 Seeing I Is a Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Bourget

2018

Erkenn

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According to some authors, perceptual ascriptions such as "Jones sees an F" are sometimes intensional, in that they can be true without there being an F. 1 The claim that there are intensional perceptual ascriptions (or IPAs) is not without opponents, but the critics' arguments are addressed in a recent article in this journal (Bourget 2017a). In this paper, I take it as read * Forthcoming in Erkenntnis.

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Factive Phenomenal Characters*

Cited by 23 publications

References 54 publications

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

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Factive Phenomenal Characters*

Cited by 23 publications

References 54 publications

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT1

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT1

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹

ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT¹