Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Hsu, Li-Chen

doi:10.1002/bdm.578

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…These findings are consistent with previous work showing that these two forms of power exert independent effects on bargaining behavior 6 , 14 , 40 and fairness perceptions 7 – 9 , 41 . By directly comparing these two power forms we conclude that both power forms are good predictors of bargaining behavior but the availability of attractive outside options (i.e., DP) is a stronger predictor of fairness perceptions (i.e., effect sizes are three to seven times larger).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

“…One reason for this selective sensitivity is that possessing decision power (even when it is due to luck) may shift one’s attention to this form of power neglecting other power forms and their legitimacy. This idea is supported by evidence that the powerful (in this case proposers) ignore the unfairness of procedures that lead to self-advantageous outcomes 40 , 47 and pay attention to information that justifies their position 48 . A potential implication of this finding is that extremely powerless individuals, who lack both legitimate and illegitimate forms of power, are more likely to justify power abuse and accept inequalities that result from illegitimate power hierarchies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Interplay between different forms of power and meritocratic considerations shapes fairness perceptions

Riedl

2022

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Power imbalance often leads to unequal allocations. However, it remains largely unknown how different forms of power and meritocratic considerations interact to shape fairness perceptions. Using modified Ultimatum Games, we examined how two power forms—decision power and availability of attractive outside option—affect bargaining behavior and fairness perceptions, and how meritocratic considerations are incorporated into the fairness perceptions of powerful and powerless individuals. We identified an asymmetric power effect: having increased decision power or attractive outside options independently increased self-advantageous allocations and self-serving fairness perceptions, whereas the combined lack of both power forms led to self-disadvantageous allocations but had no influence on fairness perceptions. The power effect on fairness perceptions became symmetric when power was obtained through a meritocratic process (procedural justice). In contrast, relative contributions to resource production (distributive justice) did not moderate power effects. We provide causal evidence that the powerful, but not the powerless, strive to minimize cognitive dissonance between behavior and fairness perceptions by interpreting fairness in self-serving ways. This study contributes novel insights into the interplay between different power forms, the asymmetry of power effects, the moderating role of procedural justice, and the mediating role of behavior in the power-driven adjustment of fairness perceptions.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Interplay between different forms of power and meritocratic considerations shapes fairness perceptions

Riedl

2022

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…That is, if players' contributions to the public good cannot be identified and bear no consequences, they are markedly lower as compared with situations in which free riding is visible to group members (Small & Loewenstein, 2005) and subject to potential sanctions (see also Sefton, Shupp, & Walker, 2007). These robust findings imply that decision makers will typically adapt their behaviour to the situational risk of facing retaliation (Hsu, 2008) quite similarly to allocators in bargaining games who tend to shift toward fair behaviour as the power of the recipient to retaliate grows (Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004).…”

Section: Determinants Of Free Riding Versus Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Contributions in the public goods game-a classical social dilemma situation-have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty-Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty-Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty-Humility.

show abstract

“…The role of other threshold parameters in the evolution of cooperation has been discussed in refs. [37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

Liu

et al. 2017

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found.

show abstract

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Cited by 10 publications

References 36 publications

Interplay between different forms of power and meritocratic considerations shapes fairness perceptions

Interplay between different forms of power and meritocratic considerations shapes fairness perceptions

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About