Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2017.04.154

Cited by 24 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…The frequency of cooperator fixation, however, does vary in sensitivity analyses aimed at examining the consequences of altering the transition rule and update process of our simulation 5 , 6 , 8 , 55 . In those sensitivity analyses, we replicated our simulation under combinations of two different transition rules (fitness proportional selection and pairwise comparison) and two separate update dynamics (synchronous and asynchronous updating), leading to a 2 × 2 research design for each spatial structure (see Tables 1 and 2 ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Johnson

Smirnov

2021

Commun Biol

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We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism’s behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its decision of when to implement that strategy, which we depict as an organism’s choice of one point in time, out of a set of discrete time slots, at which to carry out its PD strategy. Results indicate selection for cooperators across various time slots and parameter settings, including parameter settings in which cooperation would not evolve in an exclusively spatial model—as in work investigating exogenously imposed temporal networks. Moreover, in the presence of time slots, cooperators’ portion of the population grows even under different combinations of spatial structure, transition rules, and update dynamics, though rates of cooperator fixation decline under pairwise comparison and synchronous updating. These findings indicate that, under certain evolutionary processes, merely existing in time and space promotes the evolution of cooperation.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Johnson

Smirnov

2021

Commun Biol

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“…In the complex battlefield environment, the information acquisition is incomplete, asymmetric, which requires the swarm to achieve selfmanagement and self-coordination, and this requirement just coincides with the aspiration-driven dynamics. Moreover, the existing results show that, in both prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game, the dynamic mechanism driven by aspiration can improve the average abundance value and promote cooperation more than the traditional imitation dynamics [43,44].…”

Section: Mathematical Problems In Engineeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

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“…Following Fermi’s rule of strategy upgradation – an individual, i , will adopt the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbor, j , with a probability . and denote the total payoffs accumulated by j and i respectively 32 , 33 . Strong selection has been considered here.…”

Section: Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mass Testing and Proactiveness Affect Epidemic Spreading

2021

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The detection and management of diseases become quite complicated when pathogens contain asymptomatic phenotypes amongst their ranks, as evident during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Spreading of diseases has been studied extensively under the paradigm of susceptible–infected–recovered–deceased (SIRD) dynamics. Various game-theoretic approaches have also addressed disease spread, many of which consider , , , and as strategies rather than as states. Remarkably, most studies from the above approaches do not account for the distinction between the symptomatic or asymptomatic aspect of the disease. It is well-known that precautionary measures like washing hands, wearing masks and social distancing significantly mitigate the spread of many contagious diseases. Herein, we consider the adoption of such precautions as strategies and treat , , , and as states. We also attempt to capture the differences in epidemic spreading arising from symptomatic and asymptomatic diseases on various network topologies. Through extensive computer simulations, we examine that the cost of maintaining precautionary measures as well as the extent of mass testing in a population affects the final fraction of socially responsible individuals. We observe that the lack of mass testing could potentially lead to a pandemic in case of asymptomatic diseases. Network topology also seems to play an important role. We further observe that the final fraction of proactive individuals depends on the initial fraction of both infected as well as proactive individuals. Additionally, edge density can significantly influence the overall outcome. Our findings are in broad agreement with the lessons learnt from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

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Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

Cited by 24 publications

References 42 publications

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

Mass Testing and Proactiveness Affect Epidemic Spreading

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