Foreign Influence and Welfare

Antràs, Pol; Miquel, Gerard Padró i

doi:10.3386/w14129

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…In a related paper, Antràs and Padró i Miquel () stress, as we do here, that foreign influence can be welfare enhancing by internalizing cross‐national policy externalities. However, they focus on electoral politics and assume that incumbent politicians in a foreign country can take a costly action that affects the election outcome in another country.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 55%

To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities

Aidt

Hwang

2014

Canadian J of Economics

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This paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross‐national externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country. A key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not. We illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 55%

To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities

Aidt

Hwang

2014

Canadian J of Economics

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“… Less related is a literature studying the efficiency implications of cross‐border lobbying for domestic trade policy formation (Endoh , Aidt and Hwang , Antras and Padro‐i‐Miquel ), which does not consider the possibility of endogenous regime change. …”

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confidence: 99%

An economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change

Bonfatti

2017

Canadian J of Economics

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I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which a home country's main trade partner may influence the course of regime change. The foreign country intervenes in support of the group that draws the largest gains from trade, since such a group is willing to concede most in trade agreements. But interventions are more than offset by the domestic political system, which supports in power the group that concedes least (economic nationalism). I allow for geopolitical competition between the main trade partner and a second foreign country as well as for domestic ideological preferences over the two and look at how geopolitical competition interacts with the economic mechanism described above. My results help interpret some of the patterns of Western interventions in the 20th century and the role of economic nationalism in regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for incumbent elites, even when the oppositions did not have a strong communist ideology. I provide detailed historical evidence in favour of my arguments.

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Political regimes and foreign intervention

Aidt

Albornoz

2011

Journal of Development Economics

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We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.

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Foreign Influence and Welfare

Cited by 8 publications

References 40 publications

To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities

To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities

An economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change

Political regimes and foreign intervention

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