Free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, and protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987–88

Abstract

What conditions led the One Hundredth Congress of the United States to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987-88? Political partisanship is an important force, with Democrats supporting and Republicans opposing all types of trade intervention. Otherwise, the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ, particularly in the Senate. In that body, international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism, while domestic U.S. business is associated with support for classical protectionism. Liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism. In the House of Representatives, the long-standing protectionist coalition remains an influence. Few forces in support of free trade remain in U.S. politics. Changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of U.S. trade policy.

The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes

“…The seminal contribution is Milner 1988. See also Nollen and Quinn 1994. Only around 3 percent of US firms trade internationally (and just 1 percent of US firms both import and export). 12 Most firms that trade do so only at arm's length, that is, with unaffiliated parties.…”

Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

“…14 Measures of economic interest are dichotomized into measures of special interest and measures of constituency interest. Nollen and Quinn's (1994) measures of special interest are used here: the proportion of all PAC contributions accounted by labor PACs (PACLABOR), domestic corporate PACs (PACCORP), and domestic corporate PACs with the largest exports or overseas sales (PACINTL). 15 Regional indicators and committee membership indicators are also from Nollen and Quinn.…”

“…Similar estimates from probit models provided a consistency check on the structural estimates. Nollen and Quinn (1994) also analyze roll call voting during legislation of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. They consider all 30 Senate votes and 20 House votes taken during the Act's legislation, not just the key roll calls that we consider.…”

An empirical analysis of the U.S. Senate vote on NAFTA and GATT

“…A number of recent studies have focused on the voting behavior of Congress on international trade bills. In their study of congressional voting on the 1984, 1985, and 1987trade bills, Nollen and Iglarsh [1990 conclude that legislators' voting is a function of both their ideology and constituent interests. They find that those bills which are generic in nature allow legislators to vote according to their ideology.…”

“…If senators vote according to their ideological preferences, the coefficient of CEI would be positive and significant. Nollen et al [1994] argue that senators and representatives on certain legislative committees that deal with matters of trade policy are much less responsive to narrow constituent interests. These committees are known for their free trade persuasion.…”