The present article examines the theory of relative deprivation. This theory states, basically, that objective and subjective well-being are not isomorphically related, so that sometimes the better-off one is, the worse-off one feels subjectively. After a brief review of work in the area of relative deprivation, a formal model is developed. It is argued that an individual feels resentment about failure to possess something (X) only when he sees that similar others possess X, he wants X, he feels entitled to possess X, he thinks that possession of X is feasible, and he does not blame himself for his failure to possess X. The antecedents of these conditions are explored, and the consequences of the emotion of relative deprivation are studied. Empirical evidence relating to the model is summarized briefly and is found to corroborate the model. Deprivation is relative, not absolute. People feel unjustly treated or inadequately compensated when they compare themselves to some standard of reference. Because deprivation is relative, it is often true that those who are the most deprived in an objective sense are not the ones most likely to experience deprivation. These are the essential concepts of the theory of relative deprivation. They find expression in common sense and anecdotal wisdom. DeTocqueville observed that "evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested" (quoted in Davies, 1962, p. 6). Karl Marx wrote:A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside Requests for reprints should be sent to Faye