From Hardware Security Tokens to Trusted Computing and Trusted Systems

Fournaris, Apostolos P.; Κεραμίδας, Γεώργιος

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-00663-5_6

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…By expanding this logic, an isolated OS has the ability to operate on such a VM. If access to this VM is under the control of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) program on the CPU, the OS can be considered secure and isolated from any other untrusted VM running [23]. This process of an employed TCB running over the device hardware as a hypervisor structure has various implementation problems in practice, like hardware constraints, system real time behavior, scheduling and access control rights.…”

Section: Using Virtual Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Security Monitoring loggers installed on such devices need to rely on an execution environment that is capable of supporting the ADS sensors' functionality and that is protected from malicious entities. To achieve high security in legacy devices, it has been proposed in several works to introduce external security tokens that can be considered trusted [23,[28][29][30]. Having that in mind, extending the work in [2], we propose a Hardware Security Token (HST) that could be used as an external security element on legacy devices in order to instill a level of trust on collected ADS sensor logs and provide a series of security services to an associated host device and user.…”

Section: Proposed Approach For Legacy Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cryptography accelerator peripherals act as a security element of the ARM Trustzone enabled processor and consist of an RSA signature unit, an Elliptic Curve (EC) Point Operation unit (ECPO), a SHA256 hash function unit as well as a symmetric key encryption/decryption and key generation unit (using the AES algorithm), following an architecture similar to the one presented in [29]. All the HST IP cores are protected against semi-invasive and non invasive attacks [23,31,32]. The HST, using the above cryptographic peripherals, is capable of generating and verifying digital signatures and certificates, performing key agreement schemes like Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) protocol or Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol as well as AES based encryption/decryption (AES-CBC, AES-CCM) and authenticated message integrity schemes (HMAC).…”

Section: Hst Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Through this secure environment, the TCB is able to act as a point of reference for the overall system, acting as a root of trust. Apart from the security critical operations, this secure computation environment (TCB) can also be considered hard to tamper with [23]. Both industry and academia have proposed several approaches for the most efficient way this hardware root of trust mechanism should be realized.…”

Section: Introducing Trust On Software Sensorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anomaly Detection Trusted Hardware Sensors for Critical Infrastructure Legacy Devices

Fournaris

Dimopoulos

Λαμπρόπουλος

et al. 2020

Sensors

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Critical infrastructures and associated real time Informational systems need some security protection mechanisms that will be able to detect and respond to possible attacks. For this reason, Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS), as part of a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system, are needed for constantly monitoring and identifying potential threats inside an Information Technology (IT) system. Typically, ADS collect information from various sources within a CI system using security sensors or agents and correlate that information so as to identify anomaly events. Such sensors though in a CI setting (factories, power plants, remote locations) may be placed in open areas and left unattended, thus becoming targets themselves of security attacks. They can be tampering and malicious manipulated so that they provide false data that may lead an ADS or SIEM system to falsely comprehend the CI current security status. In this paper, we describe existing approaches on security monitoring in critical infrastructures and focus on how to collect security sensor–agent information in a secure and trusted way. We then introduce the concept of hardware assisted security sensor information collection that improves the level of trust (by hardware means) and also increases the responsiveness of the sensor. Thus, we propose a Hardware Security Token (HST) that when connected to a CI host, it acts as a secure anchor for security agent information collection. We describe the HST functionality, its association with a host device, its expected role and its log monitoring mechanism. We also provide information on how security can be established between the host device and the HST. Then, we introduce and describe the necessary host components that need to be established in order to guarantee a high security level and correct HST functionality. We also provide a realization–implementation of the HST overall concept in a FPGA SoC evaluation board and describe how the HST implementation can be controlled. In addition, in the paper, two case studies where the HST has been used in practice and its functionality have been validated (one case study on a real critical infrastructure test site and another where a critical industrial infrastructure was emulated in our lab) are described. Finally, results taken from these two case studies are presented, showing actual measurements for the in-field HST usage.

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Section: Using Virtual Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%