From Revolution to Resolution: Exploring Third‐Party Mediation in Nonviolent Uprisings

Abstract

Nonviolent protest movements have been prevalent in the last decades. While such movements aim for peaceful change, they are frequently followed by civil war. Previous research has shown that outcomes of nonviolent protests can be influenced by mediation, but because most previous research on conflict mediation has predominately examined armed conflicts, little is known about when and how mediation occurs. We argue that mediation in nonviolent uprisings is more likely when social conflicts generate negative externalities for the outside world, incentivizing third parties to act and conflict parties to accept their terms. After assessing the scope of the empirical field and identifying anchoring points for future research, we examine data on nonviolent campaigns between 1970 and 2014, investigating patterns in mediation incidence across time and space by situational characteristics, and by the origins of the mediator. We find that protest movements with a higher risk of violent escalation, marked by radicalism or state repression, are more likely to be mediated, and that mediation of nonviolent disputes has shifted from domestic to international mediators. We conclude by discussing theoretical implications for the field as well as suggesting some important policy and practice implications for the mediation of nonviolent conflicts.

UNASUR in Venezuela: Mediation, Bias and Legitimacy

“…Frequently, the involvement of international mediators in these situations is greater when conflicts generate negative externalities for the outside world. This context propitiates the involvement of third countries or international organisations and the parties' acceptation of the terms of the negotiation (Svensson and Lundgren 2018). This reinforces the idea that the parties to a conflict tend to accept a mediator more easily when they perceive that s/he could help to improve a dramatic situation.…”

“…Second, mediation could give greater legitimacy to opposition groups. According to the authors, when regimes accept the need for dialogue they prefer to do so without intermediaries, unless the situation has become untenable (Svensson and Lundgren 2018). Our analysis suggests that, in addition to the uncontrollable situation, governments have greater incentives to accept mediation when they believe that the third party who facilitates dialogue can help the political regime.…”

“…We also take into account a key factor that enables third-party mediation: the escalation of violence. According to a study by Svensson and Lundgren (2018), mediation in nonviolent uprisings marked by radicalism or state repression is more likely when there is a risk that violence will increase. The stronger the intensity and the longer the duration of the conflict, the more likely conflict parties are to accept mediation.…”

“…An additional argument put forward by Svensson and Lundgren (2018) is that mediation is more successful when the regime, the opposition and third parties have incentives to end the violence and reduce the intensity of the conflict. In general, governments are less likely to accept mediation owing to two factors.…”

“…Our analysis suggests that, in addition to the uncontrollable situation, governments have greater incentives to accept mediation when they believe that the third party who facilitates dialogue can help the political regime. Meanwhile, opposition groups have incentives to participate in a mediated process when they are aware of their strength to challenge the power of the regime, and trust that their demands can be heard and addressed through such a process (Svensson and Lundgren 2018). If so, even if they perceive that the mediator is swayed in favour of the government, they might accept him/her.…”