Further evidence for the case against neuropsychoanalysis: How Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou's response to our critique confirms the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend

Abstract

In their paper "The case for neuropsychoanalysis" Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou (2015) respond to our critique of neuropsychoanalysis (Blass & Carmeli, 2007), setting forth evidence and arguments which, they claim, demonstrate why neuroscience is relevant and important for psychoanalysis and hence why dialogue between the fields is necessary. In the present paper we carefully examine their evidence and arguments and demonstrate how and why their claim is completely mistaken. In fact, Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou's paper only confirms our position on the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend. We show how this trend perverts the essential nature of psychoanalysis and of how it is practiced. The clinical impact and its detrimental nature is highlighted by discussion of clinical material presented by Yovell et al (2015). In the light of this we argue that the debate over neuropsychoanalysis should be of interest to all psychoanalysts, not only those concerned with biology or interdisciplinary dialogue.

The Quest for Truth as the Foundation of Psychoanalytic Practice: a Traditional Freudian-Kleinian Perspective

“…As I have described in this paper and earlier ones (Blass 1992(Blass , 2006b(Blass , 2006c(Blass , 2011(Blass , 2015, seeking analytic truth is a dangerous affair.…”

“…have presented many of these aspects in greater detail (Blass 2001(Blass , 2003a(Blass , 2003b(Blass , 2006a(Blass , 2006b(Blass , 2006c(Blass , 2011(Blass , 2012(Blass , 2014(Blass , 2015Blass andCarmeli 2007, 2015).…”

“…Symptoms are the expression of denied truth, and here one might add psychic truth, for ultimately what we cannot bear to know are not facts per se (about ourselves or the world), but what these facts mean to us (e.g., that we are bad or unloved) or do to us (e.g., endanger our well-being). This repression or denial is regarded 1 In a series of earlier papers (most of which I reference in the course of this text), I have presented many of these aspects in greater detail (Blass 2001(Blass , 2003a(Blass , 2003b(Blass , 2006a(Blass , 2006b(Blass , 2006c(Blass , 2011(Blass , 2012(Blass , 2014(Blass , 2015Blass andCarmeli 2007, 2015).…”

Psicanálise e neurociências: contornos difusos? Notas em torno da noção de plasticidade cerebral

“…The emergence of neuropsychoanalysis has prompted positive and negative reactions (Blass, Carmeli, 2015;Yovell, Solms, Fotopoulou, 2015). On the side of psychoanalysis, criticisms have been voiced about the reductionistic, materialistic epistemological standpoint of the neuroscientific research.…”

Is the nature of psychoanalytic thinking and practice (e.g., in regard to sexuality) determined by extra‐analytic, social and cultural developments?

“…The dialogue with the neurosciences takes place amid a forceful pull towards purely mechanistic formulas for dealing with psychic issues (Blass and Carmeli, , ). In this vein the Nobel Prize neuroscientist Eric Kandel (, ) prompted psychoanalysis to align itself with a brain‐led science of mind, shifting from Freud to Pavlov, “from an emphasis on introspection to an objective analysis of stimuli and responses” (, p. 510) in order to arrive at “the elementary mechanisms of psychic processes” (p. 511).…”