Gender and cooperative behavior: economicmanrides alone

Cooperation in social dilemmas

“…Sell et al (1993), Solow and Kirkwood (2002), Chermak and Krause (2002) and Andreoni and Petrie (2008) also find no significant differences in the contributions of men and women. Contrary results are reported by Stockard et al (1988), Nowell and Tinkler (1994) and Seguino et al (1996), who show that women contribute more than men. Frank et al (1993) observe women to cooperate significantly more than men in a prisoner's dilemma game.…”

Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality

“…Results are ambiguous and often depend on the treatment (e.g., John Solow and Nicole Kirkwood, 2002, and Jean Stockard, Alphons van Kragt and Patricia Dodge, 1988). In a one-shot public good contribution setting, women contributed more than men (Seguino et al, 1996), which is broadly consistent with findings of greater initial cooperation by women that tend to disappear in a repeated setting (Charles Mason, Owen Phillips and Redington, 1991; Andreas 2 The terminology is from Gilligan and Attanucci (1988). 3 The ambiguity of the findings agrees with the complex picture also emerging from dictator and ultimatum games (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Avner Ben-Ner, Famnin Kong, Louis Putternam, 2004a; Ben-Ner, Putternam, Kong and Dan Magan, 2004b).…”

Determinanten der Einschätzung vertrauenswürdigen Verhaltens von Transaktionspartnern – ein anwendungsorientierter Erklärungsbeitrag zur Bildung subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten

“…770 Petermann (1996) Cox (2002) Trust game Men act more reciprocally than women Cox/Deck (2002) Trust game Women are more generous than men when eg. the social distance is low and the monetary cost of generosity is low Croson/Buchan (1999) Trust game No difference in trust behavior but women reciprocate significantly more than men Eckel/Wilson (2000) Trust game Women are less likely to trust than men Brown-Kruse/Hummels (1993) Public good games Men are more cooperative Cadsby/Maynes (1998) Public good games Women initially contribute more than men Meux (1973) Public good game Women are more cooperative than men Nowell/Tinkler (1994) Public good games Women are more cooperative than men Seguino et al (1996) Public good games Women are more cooperative than men Arannoff/Tedeschi (1968) Prisoners Dilemma Women are more cooperative than men Frank et al (1993) Prisoners Dilemma Women are more cooperative than men Jones et al (1968) Prisoners Dilemma Women are more cooperative than men Ortmann/Tichy (1999) Prisoners Dilemma Women cooperate more than men in the first round, no difference between the sexes in the last round Rapoport/Chammah (1965) Prisoners Dilemma No difference when men and women played against each other Male pairs showed greater overall efficiency of cooperative choices than women pairs Mason et al (1991) Duopoly market game Women are more cooperative at the beginning of the experiment than men…”