We investigate the relationship between religion and trust. Using a questionnaire, we measure: i) general religiosity, and; ii) the extent of religious beliefs, experience, and ritual. These are then analyzed with behavior in a trust game (Berg et al., Games and Economic Behavior, 1995), which we also extend by providing information of a potential trustee's religiosity in certain tasks. We find that trusting increases with the potential trustee's religiosity. The extent to which trusting increases with a trustee's religiosity, in turn, increases with a truster's religiosity. Trustworthiness also increases with religiosity, and at an increasing rate.

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Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression