Mediation is one of the most often cited concepts in current cultural-historical theory literature, in which cultural actions and artifacts are often characterized as mediators standing between situational stimuli and behavioral responses. Most often presented as a means to overcome Cartesian dualism between subject and object, and between individual and society, some scholars have nonetheless raised criticism suggesting that such mediators are problematic for a dialectical psychology that takes a unit analysis (monist) approach. In fact, Spinoza develops a monist theory of mind and body that goes without and even excludes every form of mediation. In this study, we follow up on the latter criticisms and explore what we consider to be problematic uses of the notion of mediation as an analytical construct in the literature. We elaborate an empirically grounded discussion on the ways the concept of mediation may lead to dualistic readings; and we offer an alternative account where the notion of mediator is not needed. We conclude discussing prospects for and implications of a cultural-historical theory where the notion of mediation no longer is invoked to account for human action and development.