Georgia's Rose Revolution

Mitchell, Lincoln A.

doi:10.1525/curh.2004.103.675.342

Cited by 38 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…The President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, approached the military to help repress the revolution. The military’s refusal to back Shevardnadze ensured that the Revolution was successful (Mitchell 2004, 7). A pro-democracy activist, Giorgi Kandelaki (2006, 11), stated that the realization that the military would not intervene was a crucial part of mobilizing support for the Rose Revolution.…”

Section: Democracy Assistance and Military Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance

Savage

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Countries interested in the promotion of political development often provide aid in the form of democracy assistance. However, some regimes resist these attempts to promote democracy, introducing repressive measures to counteract their effectiveness. Hence, democracy assistance sometimes has the unintended consequence of curtailing democracy. This article explains how the size of the targeted regime’s military determines the effectiveness of democracy assistance and why it can sometimes result in lower levels of political freedom. Large militaries, often holding a privileged position in authoritarian regimes, will be threatened by political liberalization and its associated redistribution of resources. They will thus work with the regime to limit the effect of democracy assistance, while their size makes this repression more feasible. In states with smaller militaries, regimes have less incentive and capacity for repression, and democracy assistance is more successful at empowering democratic opposition. Cross-national statistical analysis of the United States Agency for International Development democracy assistance supports the argument.

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Section: Democracy Assistance and Military Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance

Savage

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…The revolution sparked hopes for a better future and was considered by many as a victory of democracy not only locally but internationally (Mitchell, 2004;Karumidze & Wertsch, 2005;European Stability Initiative, 2010). New institutions were established that had the potential to become the basis of democratic governance.…”

Section: Overview Of Political Developments In Georgia Since the Rosementioning

confidence: 99%

Rise and Fall of Decentralized School Governance—Decision-Making Practices in Georgia

Gorgodze¹

2016

IES

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<p class="apa">The current study investigates educational decision-making in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. The focus is on decisions concerning issues of school governance decentralization/recentralization in the period of 2003-2012. The research draws on in-depth interviews with over 20 top decision-makers, and an extensive review of legal documents, relevant research and media reports to gain a better understanding of decision-making practices in a newly democratized state. Two theoretical foundations are employed: the Multiple Streams model of decision-making and Electoral Connection. The research largely supports the Multiple Streams theory and expands the theory of Electoral Connection to fit the political setting of a post-soviet state. Among other findings, the research shows that decisions concerning school governance recentralization were primarily election-driven.</p>

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“…In dramatic fashion the opposition, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, a leader of one of the opposition parties, forced their way into the session with roses in their hands (giving rise to the name “Rose Revolution”) and compelled Shevardnadze to flee from the session. Although Shevardnadze subsequently declared a state of emergency, the military refused to support him, and he resigned on November 23, 2003 (Mitchell, , ).…”

Section: Background: the Colored Revolutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

Ishiyama

Pechenina

2016

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective. Recent upheavals in the Middle East raise a number of questions regarding the consequences of mass uprisings. We examine the impact that earlier peaceful revolutions had on interpersonal and institutional trust in the postcommunist world. Methods. Data were collected from eight countries using two waves from the World Values Survey, three of which had experienced a colored revolt. The article uses mixed effects logit analysis and quasi-experimental techniques. Results. Levels of social trust are much less in countries where a colored revolution occurred than in countries that had not experienced such an uprising. However, confidence in political institutions increased in contrast to countries that had not experienced an uprising. Conclusion. The level of interpersonal trust is not necessarily connected to the level of institutional trust. The decline in interpersonal trust in post-colored-revolution societies does not bode well for the development of democracy after mass upheaval. TX 76203-5017 John.Ishiyama@unt.edu . The authors will share all data and coding for replication purposes.1 Although recognizing that there is much conceptual debate in the literature on the definition of "revolutions" in this article, we refer to these uprisings in postcommunist countries as "revolutions" since they were referred to in this way by the popular media and the press. Further, although it could be argued that what occurred was not "revolutionary" in that no "progress" toward democracy was made afterward, in this article we conceptualize "revolutionary" as simply the collapse of the previous political administration and its replacement with the opposition as the result of mass protests over fraudulent election results.2 To be sure, we do not wish to make universal claims that stretch far beyond the countries included in this study, which are all in one region of the world, all of which were postcommunist, and all of which were semi-authoritarian regimes. Thus we do not claim that the findings apply to all popular uprisings (such as SOCIAL

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Georgia's Rose Revolution

Cited by 38 publications

References 0 publications

Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance

Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance

Rise and Fall of Decentralized School Governance—Decision-Making Practices in Georgia

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

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