Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence

Abstract

We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Characterizing the model's success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity. Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability and prosperity. This is surprising because of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence. Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well defined topographical and political boundaries separating groups, allowing for partial autonomy within a single country. In Switzerland, mountains and lakes are an important part of the boundaries between sharply defined linguistic areas. Political canton and circle (sub-canton) boundaries often separate religious groups. Where such boundaries do not appear to be sufficient, we find that specific aspects of the population distribution guarantee either sufficient separation or sufficient mixing to inhibit intergroup violence according to the quantitative theory of conflict. In exactly one region, a porous mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and that region has experienced significant violent conflict, leading to the recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between groups can be inhibited by physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide. The success of peace in Switzerland may serve as a model to resolve conflict in other ethnically diverse countries and regions of the world.

Cooperation and Conflict in Segregated Populations

“…This interpretation clearly contradicts the original HA’s (2006b) argument. However, it is broadly consistent with Hartshorn et al’s (2013) and Rutherford et al’s (2014) analyses and, what is especially relevant, with recent empirical findings. For instance, Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr (2006) found evidence of “parochialism” in a field experiment in Papua New Guinea, where participants did not transfer higher amounts of money when paired with subjects belonging to the same ethnic group in a dictator game but harshly punished out-group participants not respecting the “fair-share” norm.…”

An Introduction to Complex Systems Science and Its Applications

“…ey found that ethnic violence did not occur when the ethnic groups were either well mixed or well separated but rather occurred only when ethnic groups separated into geographic patches (this separation falls into the same universality class as the separation of oil and water), with the violence most likely to occur for geographic patches of a particular size. is analysis implies that ethnic violence can be prevented by the use of well-placed political boundaries, as in Switzerland [67]. Although not explicitly included in the analysis, specific details of a region are relevant insofar as they are either a cause or an effect (or both) of the patch size-for instance, animosity between two ethnic groups, though not explicitly considered, may be a cause as well as a consequence of geographic segregation [68].…”

Cultural legacies and political preferences: the failure of separatism in the Swiss Jura

“…Finally, scholars have long emphasized how spatial factors, especially distance between peoples, shape network structures, identities and preferences (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967;Rokkan and Urwin, 1983;Jenkins, 1986;Rutherford et al, 2014), and this is also true in the case of Jura; indeed, it was the focus of the first systematic study of the Jurassien question (Jenkins, 1986). To measure distance, we calculated travel distance to Delémont (the capital of Jura) by car in minutes using Google maps (2014).…”

“…The last approach is structuralist . Some of these accounts are based on the idea that the social networks that facilitate collective action are fundamentally constrained by geographic factors, such as distance and topography (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Jenkins, 1986; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990 [1967]; Rutherford et al ., 2014). For example, the greater the distance from a center to its peripheries, ‘the greater the risk that these will become the nuclei of independent center formation’ (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 16), hence the looser the bonds that tie the two together and the more likely secession is to occur.…”

“…Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Wittman, 1991; Bookman, 1992; Bolton and Roland, 1997; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sorens, 2012). Still others emphasize structural constraints on individual decision-making through geographically constrained social networks (Jenkins, 1986; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990 [1967]; Rutherford et al ., 2014). Thus, whereas some scholars see secession as largely a matter of the heart, others see it as structurally determined, and others have given pride of place to the head in making such decisions.…”