Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente

Stewart, Philip D.

doi:10.2307/2151441

Cited by 5 publications

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“…My data do, however, point to an empirical phenomenon that analysts of Soviet politics need to explain. Stewart (1985) does not share Pipes' antipathy toward a psychological explanation of Soviet policy. In his view, the Soviet leadership transition may indeed be consequential, but in a quite different way from what Hough and I have supposed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

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Monitoring the Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Policy Rhetoric: What Can Be Learned?

Tetlock

1988

Journal of Social Issues

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Research psychologists cannot tell us the ultimate motives behind Soviet foreign policy or the true causes of the cold war. They can, however, use content analysis methods with records of successful application in other contexts to explore the links between rhetoric and action in American-Soviet reiations. This article describes a series of studies on the integrative complexity of American and Soviet foreign policy rhetoric. An ongoing time-series study reveals a variety of determinants of policy rhetoric: the rhetoric of the other side, imp'ending or current policy initiatives, American presidential election campaigns, and changes in both the American and Soviet leadership. The paper also describes preliminary work on the integrative complexiiy of statements of key Soviet leaders on economic and foreign policy issues, demonstrating that the current Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, is significantly more complex than either his immediate predecessors or his traditionalist rivals for the leadership. The article considers implications of the ' 'Gorbachev effect' ' for our understanding of domestic Soviet politics and for designing American policy toward the Soviet Union.Debates over the political intentions of the Soviet leadership provoke sharp conflicts among American foreign policy analysts. Advocates of "liberal" conflict-spiral positions argue that Soviet motives are fundamentally defensive (driven by security concerns) and that the current geopolitical and military competition between the superpowers derives less from the incompatibility of the actual interests of the United States and Soviet Union, and more from the propensity of

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Not all experts on the Soviet Union view the Gorbachev transition in the same light (cf. Pipes, 1986;Stewart, 1985). For example, Richard Pipes (1986), a former adviser to President Reagan, does not attach great significance to the change in leadership.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring the Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Policy Rhetoric: What Can Be Learned?

Tetlock

1988

Journal of Social Issues

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“…Do the members whose positions count favor or oppose arming Egypt and how strongly do they hold their opinions? Literature on Soviet leaders (e.g., Alexander 1984;Bialer and Afferica 1986;Breslauer 1982;Herrmann 1985;Roeder 1985;Stewart 1986;Valenta and Potter 1984), more general literature on foreign policy making (e.g., Brecher 1975;East, Salmore, and Hermann 1978;George 1980;Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987;Jervis 1976;Steinbruner 1974;Sylvan and Chan 1984;White 1970), and research on social and political cognition (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1980;Fazio 1986;Lau and Sears 1986;McGuire 1985;Petty and Cacioppo 1986) suggest four factors are among the most important potential influences on a member's position. These factors include perceptions of the international environment, personal attitudes on important issues, personality characteristics, and organizational background and affiliation.…”

Section: Factors Shaping Individual Positionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt

Stewart

Hermann

1989

Am Polit Sci Rev

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We present a contingency model of Soviet foreign policy making that focuses on decision making in the Politburo. The model is designed around three questions and shows how the answers to these questions determine the likely nature of the decision the Politburo will reach at any point in time. The questions are (1) Whose positions on the Politburo are critical to making a decision? (2) What are the positions or preferences of those who count on the issue under consideration? (3) How are disagreements among these individuals handled? The model is illustrated by examining the Soviet decision to increase significantly the numbers and types of weapons delivered to Egypt in early 1973. Of interest in this case is accounting for the shift in Soviet policy from refusing Egypt offensive weapons to providing them.

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From Cold War to Constructive Confrontation 1981–87

Ashton¹

1989

In Search of Detente

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Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente

Cited by 5 publications

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Monitoring the Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Policy Rhetoric: What Can Be Learned?

Monitoring the Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Policy Rhetoric: What Can Be Learned?

Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt

From Cold War to Constructive Confrontation 1981–87

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