Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Abstract

Governance delegation agreements—international treaties allowing external actors legal authority within host states for fixed terms—succeed in simple and, under certain conditions, complex state‐building tasks. These deals are well institutionalized and have input legitimacy because ratification requires sufficient domestic support from a ruling coalition. In order to obtain that input legitimacy, however, host states constrain external actors commensurate with their level of statehood: Stronger states delegate less legal authority. This article argues that these constraints, which produce joint rather than complete authority, require external actors to work within state structures rather than substituting for them, and thus make coordination of complex tasks more difficult. A quantitative overview of data on consent‐based peacekeeping missions complements a qualitative analysis focused on comparative case studies in Melanesia and Central America to test the theory. The results support the theory and suggest that these deals hold promise particularly for accomplishing complex tasks in especially weak states.

External Actors, State‐Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction

“…Her statistical analysis of United Nations Chapter VI Peacekeeping Missions that are based on the consent of the host country and, thus, represent delegation agreements, demonstrates the ability of these missions to significantly reduce the levels of violence. Her statistical findings, based on Chapter VI interventions alone, are more positive than those of Lake and Fariss, whose database includes Chapter VII, which do not require country consent, as well as Chapter VI interventions (compare Lake and Farris and Matanock 2014). Unlike trusteeships, delegations agreements, although complex, have a good chance of securing input legitimacy because they are the result of contracting.…”

“…Second, state‐building efforts that proceed from contracting (by delegation, see Matanock 2014, or by interstate agreements, see Börzel and van Hüllen 2014) are more likely to be successful. At a minimum, contracting makes input legitimacy much more likely because the political elites governing the country must positively agree to terms.…”

“…The actors involved at the national and local levels will depend on elite calculations and political structures. In the Solomon Islands, the success of RAMSI enhanced support among the population, putting pressure on national elites to keep to their original bargain (Matanock 2014). In Georgia, Saakashvili embraced EU programs because anticorruption was a key element of his appeal to the electorate (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014).…”

“…To avoid circular reasoning with regard to our dependent variable, we consider output legitimacy with regard to two processes: Local domestic actors and communities might consider international actors as legitimate in anticipation of their performance or because they trust their knowledge and moral authority. Over time, a virtuous cycle might evolve in which the initial performance of external actors meets the expectations of local communities which then increases the formers’ legitimacy and, hence, their effectiveness (see articles by Beisheim et al. 2014; Matanock 2014; Schäferhoff 2014). …”

Are Charter Cities Legitimate?

“…Aila Matanock has recently shown that there are "delegation agreements" between countries that have produced desirable outcomes. 48 For example, confronted with growing violence and rising corruption the Governor General of the Solomon Islands requested Australia to take over law enforcement in 2003. The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) "brought in more than 2,000 soldiers and other personnel and succeeded in establishing the rule of law before departing in 2013.…”