Government-Sponsored Mass Killing and Civil War Reoccurrence

Uzonyi, Gary; Hanania, Richard

doi:10.1093/isq/sqx050

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…To address this possible shortcoming in our analysis, we estimate an additional model where we account for this potential bias through the inclusion of an inverse Mills ratio (DeMeritt, 2015;Uzonyi and Hanania, 2017). Drawing on work by DeMeritt (2015) and Uzonyi and Hanania (2017), we re-estimate our model with the inclusion of an inverse Mills ratio that accounts for the underlying selection effects regarding which groups receive training from successful rebels and which do not receive similar support. As part of the first stage, we estimate a logistic regression that predicts the offer of training by successful former rebels.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

Keels

Benson

Widmeier³

2020

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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This paper addresses the relationship between rebel training from external sponsors and civil war outcomes. While past research has examined how foreign support, broadly, shapes the dynamics of civil wars, little attention has been paid to how foreign training of rebel fighters affects civil wars. We theorize that rebels that receive training from formerly successful rebels are more likely to experience favorable conflict outcomes than those with no training or with training from sponsors inexperienced with fighting a civil war. These propositions are tested with a quantitative analysis of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2010, providing support for our hypothesis.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

Keels

Benson

Widmeier³

2020

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Ulfelder and Valentino (2008) provide an alternative dataset on government mass killing that extends to 1945. However, these data do not focus on genocide or politicide, and display quite different patterns than our concept of interest (see Uzonyi and Hanania 2017). Rummel (1997) also provides a dataset of what he calls "democide."…”

Section: Key Independent Variablementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Second, genocide and politicide help preserve the incumbent's status quo and reduce the likelihood that the regime will face challenges following the violence (Uzonyi and Hanania 2017). This is because mass violence builds the regime's coercive power, allies the military to the regime, and eliminates the opportunity for the opposition to challenge the regime (Levitsky and Way 2013).…”

Section: How Genocide and Politicide Hinder Democratizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genocide, Politicide, and the Prospects of Democratization since 1900

Uzonyi

Kim

Jahanbani

et al. 2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Why do some autocracies democratize? A country’s violent past has received little attention. We argue that genocide and politicide undermine democratization by binding the elites’ supporters more tightly to the governing power, while cementing in-group/out-group animosities, and helping preserve the elites’ status quo position within the state. We test this argument on a new dataset of government atrocity and democratization since 1900. These novel data allow us to capture many important instances of atrocity missed by others, and thus take a longer look at democratization and violence throughout history. We find that episodes of genocide and politicide are associated with a lower likelihood of democratization in both the short and long run. These effects are larger and more consistent than other common explanations for democratization. They also differ from the effects of non-genocidal civil war violence.

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“…If the killing occurs during war, the government hopes to defeat the rebels quickly by draining their opportunity to continue fighting (Fjelde and Hultman 2014). As genocide and politicide target civilians, the atrocities may undermine the opposition's strength, restricting flows of food, fighters, money, and other support to the group's armed wing (Uzonyi and Hanania 2017). In both situations, the government kills until it reduces threat or another actor forces it to stop (Bellamy 2015).…”

Section: Uncertainty and The Duration Of Atrocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Group identification, uncertainty, and the duration of genocide and politicide

Uzonyi

2020

International Interactions

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Episodes of genocide and politicide show remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within months; others continue for decades. Why do some persist while others end soon after they start? I argue that uncertainty influences the duration of killing. When a government has difficulty identifying members of a target group, it is less certain that it has accomplished its violent goals vis-à-vis the group. Therefore, the more uncertain the government is about the source of the threat it faces, the longer its killing will last. Statistical analysis of all episodes of genocide and politicide from 1955 to 2011 supports these claims.

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Government-Sponsored Mass Killing and Civil War Reoccurrence

Cited by 12 publications

References 63 publications

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

Genocide, Politicide, and the Prospects of Democratization since 1900

Group identification, uncertainty, and the duration of genocide and politicide

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