Governmental subsidy policies and supply chain decisions with carbon emission limit and consumer’s environmental awareness

Xu, Liang; Wang, Chuanxu; Zhang, Miao; Chen, Jihong

doi:10.1051/ro/2018094

Cited by 57 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…erefore, the larger the competition intensity is, the more fierce the collection is. Consistent with Zou et al [48], Xu et al [49] and Jerbia et al [50], we get a symmetric influence between two channels. We suppose there exists competition between the two collection channels.…”

Section: Assumptionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Shi

Chen

2020

Complexity

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This paper explores the decision-making and coordination mechanism of pricing and collection rate in a closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraint in recycling channels, which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. On the basis of game theory, the equilibriums of decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios are obtained and compared. Through the performance analysis of a different scenario, a higher saving production cost and lower competition intensity trigger the members to engage in remanufacturing. Furthermore, we try to propose a two-part tariff contract through bargaining to coordinate supply chain and achieve a Pareto improvement. The results show that when the capacity constraints in recycling channels exceed a threshold, the decisions and profit will change. Additionally, for closed-loop supply chain, the selling price is more susceptible to the influence of capacity constraint in recycling channel than the members’ profit.

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Section: Assumptionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Shi

Chen

2020

Complexity

Self Cite

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“…Besides these, many of the researchers have worked in these directions in recent trends [8,23,31]. From the Table 1, it can be concluded that this study is partially similar to Ranjan and Jha [20] and Mondal et al [18].…”

Section: Promotional Effortsupporting

confidence: 71%

Optimal strategies of a dual-channel green supply chain with recycling under retailer promotional effort

Pal

Sarkar

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Due to the hugely populated world, recycling of the used products has become the most significant perspective in e-commerce. The scientists have been exploring how increases the degree of recyclability and the green innovation level. This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer, a retailer, a supplier, and a collector. The manufacturer can increase or decrease the level of green innovation by changing the quality of raw materials. He sells them through his direct channel as well as the retailer's traditional channel. The retailer enforces the strategy promotional effort for enlarging his market demand. After Formulating the problem, the strategies in collector-led, supplier-led, collector-supplier Nash, and collector-supplier-retailer Nash game are studied under manufacturer Stackelberg games along with the centralized policy. The parameters' sensitivity has been analyzed to the profit and decision variables and then draw significant managerial insights. The model declares the optimal strategies for each player as well as the chain. It is achieved that the higher level of green innovation and promotional effort always increases all the profits. The optimal pricing decisions be lowest under the Collector-Supplier Nash game.

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“…When discussing carbon trading, the extant literature assumes that the carbon price is a fixed exogenous variable [40][41][42][43]. However, we assumed that the carbon price is affected by Demand and Supply and found that with the increase in the carbon price sensitivity coefficient, the e-commerce platform's sales promotion service first increases and then declines, and the manufacturer's profit first declines and then increases.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Carbon Trading Mechanism, Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain and Sustainable Development

et al. 2021

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Considering the carbon trading mechanism and consumers’ preference for low-carbon products, a game decision-making model for the low-carbon e-commerce supply chain (LCE-SC) is constructed. The influences of commission and carbon trading on the optimal decisions of LCE-SC are discussed and then verified through numerical analysis. On this basis, the influence of carbon trading on regional sustainable development is empirically analyzed. The results show that the establishment of carbon trading pilots alleviates the negative impact of unfair profit distribution. Increasing the commission rate in a reasonable range improves the profitability of LCE-SC. Nevertheless, with the enhancement of consumers’ low-carbon preference, a lower commission rate is more beneficial to carbon emission reduction. The total carbon emission is positively related to the commission rate. However, the unit carbon emission decreases first and then increases with the commission rate. The influence of the carbon price sensitivity coefficient on the service level is first positive and then negative, while the influence on the manufacturer’s profit goes the opposite. The empirical analysis confirms that the implementation of carbon trading is conducive to regional sustainable development and controlling environmental governance intensity promotes carbon productivity.

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Governmental subsidy policies and supply chain decisions with carbon emission limit and consumer’s environmental awareness

Cited by 57 publications

References 36 publications

Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Optimal strategies of a dual-channel green supply chain with recycling under retailer promotional effort

Carbon Trading Mechanism, Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain and Sustainable Development

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