Green Supply Chain Finance Credit Market under
Government Regulation:
An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Feng, Bao Feng; Feng, Chang; Zhao, Shukai

doi:10.15244/pjoes/168262

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The four parties mentioned above interact and influence each other during the evolution of the game. Based on this model, the following basic assumptions are proposed: Assumption 1: All the players in the game are Bounded rationality [14] , including the government, enterprises, environmental NGOs and consumers.…”

Section: Basic Assumptions Of Evolutionary Game Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Transformation from Traditional Logistics to Green Logistics under the Background of Dual Carbon

Hou,

Xie

2023

Atlantis Highlights in Engineering

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Green logistics is an important measure in response to national energy conservation and emission reduction policies, and in the long run, it is also a necessary measure to save costs for enterprises. This article aims to address the obstacles in the transition from traditional logistics to green logistics, and constructs a four party evolutionary game model of government, environmental NGOs, logistics enterprises, and consumers. The model consists of top-down transportation, bottom-up circulation, forward logistics, and reverse logistics to form a green logistics loop; Several Equant are solved by establishing duplicate dynamic equations, Jacobian matrix and determinant, etc., and the local stability of Equant is analyzed by using Lyapunov's first rule.By analyzing the evolutionary game model, this study explores the impact of government policies on corporate behavior, thereby providing reference for the formulation of relevant policies by government departments.

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Section: Basic Assumptions Of Evolutionary Game Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Transformation from Traditional Logistics to Green Logistics under the Background of Dual Carbon

Hou,

Xie

2023

Atlantis Highlights in Engineering

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“…"Carbon peaking" refers to the point where carbon emission in a certain area starts to decline after reaching a peak, while "carbon neutrality" means reducing net carbon emission to zero through measures such as emission reduction and carbon sequestration. These two objectives are collectively known as the "dual carbon" goal [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behaviors Based on Constraints of “Dual Carbon” Goal

Ge,

Wu,

Wang

et al. 2024

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

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The government, enterprises, and consumers play an important role in the realization of the "dual carbon" goal. However, the relationship between consumer behavior and this goal has not received sufficient attention. Based on theories related to green consumption, this paper analyzes the internal psychological factors of consumers and external influencing factors and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, and consumers. The findings are as follows: (1) If the consumer's price sensitivity coefficient is either too high or too low, it does not favor the evolution of consumer behavior towards green consumption, nor does it encourage enterprises to adopt green production practices. In such scenarios, government regulation and the provision of green subsidies to consumers and enterprises might be more effective. (2) The larger the green preference coefficient of consumers, the more likely they are to opt for green consumption, which in turn accelerates the shift of enterprises towards green production. In this situation, a robust supply and demand market for green products can effectively alleviate the pressure of environmental regulation. (3) The government's "dual carbon" policy publicity prompts consumers to choose green consumption and enterprises to choose green production. (4) Government subsidies to enterprises and to consumers both encourage enterprises to choose green production and consumers to choose green consumption. The results of this study provide enlightenment on the development of the green product market and the achievement of the "dual carbon" goal.

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Game theory analysis of operational decision-making in green supply chain: The impact of consumer preferences

Shi

2024

SHS Web Conf.

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In the current global context of increasing emphasis on sustainable development, high carbon emissions and resource waste in traditional supply chains have become critical factors affecting supply chain efficiency. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis of green supply chain operational decisions from the perspective of consumer green preferences, utilizing game theory. Through the construction of Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg competition, and cooperative game models, this study explores the decision-making behaviors of suppliers and retailers and their interaction mechanisms under different game scenarios. The research findings indicate that as consumer green preferences strengthen, the level of green investment by various supply chain parties significantly increases. Under Nash equilibrium conditions, the optimal wholesale price rises with the increase in consumer green preferences, thereby enhancing the overall profit of the supply chain. Furthermore, cooperative game results demonstrate that supply chain participants can achieve maximized total profits through cooperation, outperforming the performance under Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg competition models. Therefore, the significance and value of this research lie in providing theoretical and practical support for addressing issues of green strategic planning and cooperation mechanisms in supply chains, particularly emphasizing the impact of consumer green preferences on supply chain strategies and operational decisions.

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Green Supply Chain Finance Credit Market under Government Regulation: An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Cited by 7 publications

References 29 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Transformation from Traditional Logistics to Green Logistics under the Background of Dual Carbon

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Transformation from Traditional Logistics to Green Logistics under the Background of Dual Carbon

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behaviors Based on Constraints of “Dual Carbon” Goal

Game theory analysis of operational decision-making in green supply chain: The impact of consumer preferences

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