Grundzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie

Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.

“…Within this context, it becomes clear that the strength of the critical intention must be high enough in comparison to other intentions. If this is not the case, then a fiat or decision to act on the intention is required (James, 1890;Moya, 1990;Wundt, 1902). Such a fiat can be conceived of as a second goal superimposed on the intention.…”

“…The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general. : automatic, unintentional, uncontrolled, autonomous, unconscious Automaticity is a concept with a long-standing history in psychology (e.g., James, 1890;Wundt, 1903). It has been invoked in domains as diverse as perception (MacLeod, 1991), memory (Jacoby, 1991), social cognition (Wegner & Bargh, 1998), learning (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), motivation (Carver & Scheier, 2002), and emotion (Scherer, 1993).…”

“…Automaticity is a concept with a long-standing history in psychology (e.g., James, 1890;Wundt, 1903). It has been invoked in domains as diverse as perception (MacLeod, 1991), memory (Jacoby, 1991), social cognition (Wegner & Bargh, 1998), learning (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), motivation (Carver & Scheier, 2002), and emotion (Scherer, 1993).…”

“…Approaches to Automaticity James (1890), Jastrow (1906), and Wundt (1896Wundt ( /1897Wundt ( , 1903 offered some of the earliest descriptions of automaticity, and many of their ideas have reemerged in contemporary accounts. The views presented below are also based on early studies of skill development (Bryan & Harter, 1899) and early dual-task studies (Solomons & Stein, 1896; see review by Shiffrin, 1988).…”

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

“…27 As Mabbott (1951, pp. 156) reads him, James had in mind both experiments on the so-called 'indifference interval' (Wundt 1911), which is the interval of time that is least likely to be over-or under-estimated in memory-which would explain the lower figure-and experiments on the maximum duration of a group of sounds that could be remembered accurately-which could explain the higher figure. If correct, the individuation argument can perhaps help to show what exactly is wrong with these attempts to connect phenomenology with psychophysics. Instead of intelligibly linking the question of the length of the specious present with the question as to how it is possible for us to perceive movements and changes, they, in effect, take our ability to perceive movements and changes for granted, and then try to find patterns within such experiences that reflect the length of the specious present, or assume that, with such experiences, their temporal extent is introspectively given.…”