Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice

Barker, Simon; Crerar, Charlie; Goetze, Trystan S.

doi:10.1017/s1358246118000528

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…Similarly, Goldberg (2016) appeals to the epistemic harms of lacking evidence. The epistemic injustice literature includes a rich discussion of other types of epistemic harms; see, for example, Fricker (2007), Barker, Crerar, and Goetze (2018), McKinnon (2016), Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus (2017), Medina (2013), and Dotson (2011).…”

Section: Collective Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Fleisher

Šešelja

2022

Philos. sci.

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Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’ (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry.

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Section: Collective Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Fleisher

Šešelja

2022

Philos. sci.

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“…Two things are at issue here, an action and a proposition on which this action is based. The action is voting for Red; the content of the proposition is "a vote for Red 8 While calls for non-ideal theorizing in political philosophy have become commonplace, comparable discussion of non-ideal epistemology is still relatively rare (although see Barker et al 2018). However, many developments in social epistemology move towards the non-ideal end.…”

Section: Deference In Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 8 While calls for non-ideal theorizing in political philosophy have become commonplace, comparable discussion of non-ideal epistemology is still relatively rare (although see Barker et al . 2018). However, many developments in social epistemology move towards the non-ideal end.…”

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confidence: 99%

In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Brinkmann

2020

Episteme

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Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that (i) deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and (ii) most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with.

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“…This has led primarily to a focus on intellectual vices, perverse epistemic practices, and epistemic oppression (cf. Barker et al 2018). What prosocial practices and virtues might be required as responses to the non-ideal needs further development.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Barker et al . 2018). What prosocial practices and virtues might be required as responses to the non-ideal needs further development.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forgiveness and the Repairing of Epistemic Trust

Green

2021

Episteme

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The epistemic relevance of forgiveness has been neglected by both the discussion of forgiveness in moral psychology and by social epistemology generally. Moral psychology fails to account for the forgiveness of epistemic wrongs and for the way that wrongs in general have epistemic implications. Social epistemology, for its part, neglects the way that epistemic trust is not only conferred but repaired. In this essay, I show that the repair of epistemic trust through forgiveness is necessary to the economy of knowledge for fallible persons like us. Despite the fact that forgiveness is never included on lists of important intellectual virtues or epistemic activities, it is vital to our lives as social knowers. Likewise, an account of forgiveness that neglects its epistemic dimension is importantly incomplete.

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Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice

Cited by 6 publications

References 79 publications

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Forgiveness and the Repairing of Epistemic Trust

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