Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion

Karakaya, Mehmet

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.004

Cited by 24 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The stability concepts used to analyze our model are borrowed primarily from hedonic games literature; consult [3][4][5][6]8,11,13] and their references. Hedonic games are coalition formation games in which how much a player values a group depends solely on who is in her group and is independent of how the remaining players are partitioned into groups.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, we provide results on the existence and quality of many different coalitional solution concepts, focusing especially on permission to leave and join projects. These ideas are captured precisely by solution concepts from hedonic games literature [3][4][5][6]8,11,13]; to our knowledge we are the first to consider them in the context of non-cooperative games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities

Anshelevich

Postl

2016

Theory Comput Syst

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We study profit sharing games in which players select projects to participate in and share the reward resulting from that project equally. Unlike most existing work, in which it is assumed that the player utility is monotone in the number of participants working on their project, we consider non-monotone player utilities. Such utilities could result, for example, from "threshold" or "phase transition" effects, when the total benefit from a project improves slowly until the number of participants reaches some critical mass, then improves rapidly, and then slows again due to diminishing returns.Non-monotone player utilities result in a lot of instability: strong Nash equilibrium may no longer exist, and the quality of Nash equilibria may be far away from the centralized optimum. We show, however, that by adding additional requirements such as players needing permission to leave a project from the players currently on this project, or instead players needing permission to a join a project from players on that project, we ensure that strong Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, just the addition of permission to leave already guarantees the existence of strong Nash equilibrium within a factor of 2 of the social optimum. In this paper, we provide results on the existence and quality of several different coalitional solution concepts, focusing especially on permission to leave and join projects, and show that such requirements result in the existence of good stable solutions even for the case when player utilities are non-monotone.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities

Anshelevich

Postl

2016

Theory Comput Syst

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“…We focus on a specific context of coalition formation: the hedonic game [18]. First, we define the following complete, reflexive and transitive binary preference relation for any user n ∈ N :…”

Section: Social-behavioral Network Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, in order to control unnecessary handovers and call blocking rate, here we borrow the idea from social organizations and introduce four typical preference rules to specify membership behavioral restrictions [18]:…”

Section: Social-behavioral Network Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic network selection in HetNets: A social-behavioral (SoBe) approach

Cao

Duan

Cheng

et al. 2014

2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference

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In this paper, we propose a two-layer game-theoretic framework to solve the network selection problem in heterogeneous wireless networks (HetNets). At the intra-network layer, a hierarchical game among the SP and its admitted users is employed, and the closed-form equilibrium solutions for the pricing and transmission rate are provided. Meanwhile, at the inter-network layer, all service providers (SP) and the active users are engaged in a dynamic hedonic game and finally self-organized into a Nash-stable coalition structure. The key feature of our proposed approach is the inclusion of socialbehavioral (SoBe) constraints capturing the real-world user and SP preferences, hierarchy and membership. Not only that SoBe more accurately models practical scenarios, it also leads to markedly reduced unnecessary handovers, and well maintained call blocking rate. Simulations confirm the superior performance of SoBe in comparison with the widely adopted user-driven alternative in terms of nearly all critical performance criteria.

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“…A com monly studied stability concept is the Nash stability. However, the recently introduced notion of strong Nash stability has been proved to be a natural choice and is stronger than the Nash stablity [14].…”

Section: B Preliminaries Of Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A strong Nash stability based approach to minimum quasi clique partitioning

Basu

Sengupta²,

Maulik

et al. 2014

2014 Sixth International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS)

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Ahstract-The problem of network partitioning into cohesive subgroups is of utmost interest in analysis of social networks. In this paper we use quasi clique based partitioning to study social cohesion. We propose a greedy algorithm based on the notion of strong Nash stability to determine the cohesive sub groups in a network. Through experimental results we show that the proposed algorithm yields promising results by identifying meaningful, compact and dense clusters in many real life social network data sets.

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Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion

Cited by 24 publications

References 13 publications

Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities

Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities

Dynamic network selection in HetNets: A social-behavioral (SoBe) approach

A strong Nash stability based approach to minimum quasi clique partitioning

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