Hegel’s “Objective Spirit”, extended mind, and the institutional nature of economic action

Boldyrev, Ivan; Herrmann‐Pillath, Carsten

doi:10.1007/s11299-012-0111-3

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…), also involves noetic products (technologies, devices, infrastructures, computers, industrial plants, airplanes, and so on). It is distributed intelligence: a technological materialisation of Hegel's objective spirit, conceived as an extended, externalised and institutionalised structure on which individual intelligence, autonomy and creativity to a large degree depend (Boldyrev & Herrmann-Pillath, 2013). The noosphere evolves into a quasiautonomous planetary network of advanced technologies and global circuits.…”

Section: The Ascent Of the Spirit And The Noospherementioning

confidence: 99%

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Phenomenology of the Noosphere

Zwart

2021

Philosophy of Engineering and Technology

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Although Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) was thoroughly trained in philosophy and theology, he was first and foremost a paleoanthropologist, directly involved in the discovery of Homo erectus pekinensis (“Sinanthropus”) in China in the 1920s and 1930s. He came from a Catholic aristocratic background, was ordained a priest in 1911, survived World War I (as a stretcher-bearer, distinguished with the Legion of Honour), joined the Jesuit Order, conducted paleoanthropological field work during the interbellum, and became entangled in a conflict with his Jesuit superiors (over pantheism and the concept of original sin) until his death in New York (in exile more or less). When his writings were published (shortly after his death, as his superiors forbade publication during his lifetime), he quickly became an intellectual celebrity. Currently, he is credited with having anticipated Gaia theory (King, 2006), the global village concept (McLuhan, 1962), the Internet (Barlow, 1992; Cobb, 1998), the WWW (Garreau, 2005, p. 256; Greenfield, 2014, p. 9), transhumanism (Delio, 2014; Steinhart, 2008), the “global brain” (Stock, 1993), and the Anthropocene (e.g. Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2011).

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Section: The Ascent Of the Spirit And The Noospherementioning

confidence: 99%

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Phenomenology of the Noosphere

Zwart

2021

Philosophy of Engineering and Technology

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“…Pivotal constructs in economics, such as that of preference, have been reconstructed in their ‘neither behavioral nor mental’ status (Guala, 2019) by analogically using Hegel’ idea of the passage from ‘Subjective’ to ‘Objective’ Spirit (e.g. Boldyrev and Herrmann-Pillath, 2013, Section 4).…”

Section: Toward a Notion Of Economic Cognitive Institutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Aoki's distinction between mentalist and materialist institutions is also important because it allows us to introduce a view of economic institutions that is the closest, not only in terms of contents but also in terms of references, to that of cognitive institution we introduce in this paper. Hegel's view of institutions, as reconstructed by Crisafi and Gallagher (2010), has been recently used by institutional economists to explain the nature of institutions as constitutive parts of economic cognitive processes (Boldyrev and Herrmann-Pillath, 2013;Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, 2014). Pivotal constructs in economics, such as that of preference, have been reconstructed in their 'neither behavioral nor mental' status (Guala, 2019) by analogically using Hegel' idea of the passage from 'Subjective' to 'Objective' Spirit (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Economic cognitive institutions

Petracca

Gallagher

2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

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This paper introduces the notion of ‘cognitive’ institution and discusses its relevance to institutional economics. Cognitive institutions are conceptually founded on the philosophy of mind notion of extended mind, broadened to also include the distinctly social, institutional, and normative dimensions. Cognitive institutions are defined as institutions that not just allow agents to perform certain cognitive processes in the social domain but, more importantly, without which some of the agents' cognitive processes would not exist or even be possible. The externalist point of view of the extended mind has already had some influence in institutional economics: Arthur Denzau and Douglass North first introduced the notion of institution understood in terms of ‘shared mental models’, and relatedly philosopher Andy Clark introduced the notion of ‘scaffolding institution’. We discuss shared mental models and scaffolding institutions and go a step further by showing that the notion of cognitive institution can capture more fundamental and salient aspects of economic institutions. In particular, we focus on the market as an economic cognitive institution.

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“…6 This is based on the 'neohegelian' approach to economics that Ivan Boldyrev and I have elaborated in our (2014) book. For a shorter overview, see Boldyrev and Herrmann-Pillath (2013). 7 That is why Hegel counts as 'idealist', although a much more adequate characterisation is Stern's (2008) one; a ' conceptual realist'.…”

Section: The Objectivity Of Geist and The Possibility Of Cultural Scimentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilthey and Darwin Combined? 19th Century Geisteswissenschaft for 21st Century Cultural Science

Herrmann‐Pillath

2018

Cultural Science Journal

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This paper explores the relevance of Dilthey’s conceptualisation of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ (human sciences) for Cultural Science. In a nutshell, I argue that Cultural Science is Dilthey plus Darwin. In this effort, I define the Geisteswissenschaften as ‘performative sciences’: Taking economics as an example, I show that the Geisteswissenschaften are sciences which are ontologically productive in creating and performing the object of their research. That means, they are inherently normative since they entail critical reflexivity as a major mode of research. Following Dilthey, Geisteswissenschaften are deeply historical, which implies that their disciplinary structure is evolving together with their objects. Therefore, I argue that the 19th century division of disciplines needs to be thoroughly overhauled in the 21st century, including the division between economics and sociology, which is a left-over from 19th century nation-state development. New disciplines, with Cultural Science and Technosphere Science as prime examples, must be established to cope with the challenges of our times: where human agency, culture and technology have blurred long-established boundaries separating nature, culture and society; where identity and meaning have become global, fluid, contested and reflexive phenomena; and where nature (the environment) and culture (cities) are inextricably interrelated in the dynamics of the emergent Anthropocene system.

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Hegel’s “Objective Spirit”, extended mind, and the institutional nature of economic action

Cited by 12 publications

References 63 publications

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Phenomenology of the Noosphere

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Phenomenology of the Noosphere

Economic cognitive institutions

Dilthey and Darwin Combined? 19th Century Geisteswissenschaft for 21st Century Cultural Science

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