The correspondence between Paul Bernays and Kurt Gödel is one of the most extensive in the two volumes of Gödel's collected works devoted to his letters of (primarily) scientific, philosophical and historical interest. It ranges from 1930 to 1975 and deals with a rich body of logical and philosophical issues, including the incompleteness theorems, finitism, constructivity, set theory, the philosophy of mathematics, and postKantian philosophy, and contains Gödel's thoughts on many topics that are not expressed elsewhere. In addition, it testifies to their life-long warm personal relationship. I have given a detailed synopsis of the Bernays Gödel correspondence, with explanatory background, in my introductory note to it in Vol. IV of Gödel's Collected Works, pp. 41-79. References to individual items by Gödel follow the system of these volumes, which are either of the form Gödel 19xx or of the form *Gödel 19xx with possible further addition of a letter in the case of multiple publications within a given year; the former are from CW I or CW II, while the latter are from CW III. Thus, for example, Gödel 1931 is the famous incompleteness paper, while Gödel 1931c is a review that Gödel wrote of an article by Hilbert, both in CW I; Gödel °1933o is notes for a lecture, "The present situation in the foundations of mathematics," to be found in CW III. Pagination is by reference to these volumes, e.g. Gödel 1931, CW I, p. 181, or simply, CW I, p. 181. In the case of correspondence, reference is by letter number and/or date within a given body of correspondence, as e.g. (Gödel to Bernays) letter #56, or equivalently 2 Dec. 1965, under Bernays in CW IV. When an item in question was originally written in German, my quotation from it is taken from the facing English translation. Finally, reference will be made to various of the introductory notes written by the editors and colleagues that accompany most of the pieces or bodies of correspondence. incompleteness theorem: no consistent formal axiomatic extension of a system that contains a sufficient amount of arithmetic is complete. Both of these deserved Hilbert's approbation, but not a word passed from him in public or in writing at the time. In fact, there are no communications between Hilbert and Gödel and they never met. Perhaps the second incompleteness theorem on the unprovability of consistency of a system took Hilbert by surprise. We don't know exactly what he made of it, but we can appreciate that it might have been quite disturbing, for he had invested a great deal of thought and emotion in his finitary consistency program which became problematic as a result. There is just one comment, of a dismissive character, that he made about it four years later; I will return to that in the following.