Hobbes, Religion, and Rational Choice: Hobbes’s two Leviathans and the Fool

Abstract

Some recent interpreters of Hobbes have deployed techniques of game theory in the service of showing that cooperation in the Hobbesian state of nature is possible. I argue against this strategy in two ways. First, I show that Hobbes did not intend the state of nature as a starting point of the theory from which the possibility of exit must be explained, but rather as a rhetorically useful depiction of the consequences of wrongful understandings of men's civil and religious duties. Secondly, I show that the game theoretic techniques of these interpreters can be used in a new way to demonstrate both the inherent tendency toward civil war in existing Christian states, and the superior stability of the Hobbesian political order. to my friend Jean Hampton, in memoriam"Peace at home may then be expected durable, when the common people shall be made to see the benefit they shall receive by their obedience and adhaesion to their own Sovereign, and the harm they must suffer by taking part with them, who by promises of reformation, or change of government deceive them. And this is properly to be done by divines, and from arguments not only from reason, but also from the Holy Scripture"Th. Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, London, Printed for William Crooke 1681*

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

“…I will not examine the entirety of this literature—much the less the broader ‘orthodox interpretation’ of Hobbes as the philosopher of self‐interested contractarianism (Gaus, )—which would be far too much for this paper, but only a small section of it: the discussion of the exit from the state of nature, and more specifically Hobbes' answer to the ‘foole’ (Hobbes, : XV.4–5; Zaitchik, ; Hampton, ; Kavka, ; Hoekstra, ). The arguments advanced by these studies have been, on their own terms, decisively refuted by Pasquale Pasquino (Pasquino, ); yet they remain useful, ex negativo , to better understand the limits of consequentialism within Hobbes' framework.…”

“…As Pasquino reminded us, the natural state is not:

a starting point of the theory from which the possibility of exit must be explained, but rather [...] a rhetorically useful depiction of the consequences of wrongful understandings of men's civil and religious duties . (Pasquino, : 406)

…”

“…By more explicitly excluding the consideration of the natural condition, and by replacing the ‘or’ with an ‘and’, the Latin text clarifies that the answer to the fool is limited to the civil state's case, thus entails nothing about covenants in the natural state. Having established the point, Pasquino proceeds with his argument about how Hobbes tried to restructure the incentives to obey the sovereign in the civil state, against the preferences' framework resulting from prevailing religious world‐views (Pasquino, : 412 ff) . On this account, the question of leaving the natural state loses its relevance: it could happen by chance, coercion, or even for irrational motives (Eggers, : 197–198).…”

Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero‐sum Games in the State of Nature

“…2 2 See, e.g., Taylor 1976; Ullmann‐Margalit 1977; McLean 1981; Kavka 1983, 1986; Hampton 1986, 1991; Neal 1988; Gauthier 1988; Haji 1990, 1991; Shaver 1990; Hardin 1991; Boonin‐Vail 1994; Nida‐Rümelin 1996; Slomp and La Manna 1996; Alexander 2001;Pasquino 2001; Dodds and Shoemaker 2002; Kisner 2004; Hüttemann 2004; Boulting 2005; and Piirimäe 2006. See also Barry 1965; Rawls 1971; Curley 1989, 1994; Ryan 1996; Harrison 2003; and Hoekstra 2007. …”

“…Jean Hampton (1986, 61) concedes that at least the “rationality account of conflict” developed by Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan is approriately represented by a PD matrix. More recently, PD interpretations have been advocated by Boonin‐Vail (1994), Nida‐Rümelin (1996), Pasquino (2001), and Hüttemann (2004); Boulting (2005) has tried to defend the PD interpretation against some of the most popular challenges.…”